Advaitasiddhi 2.302

2.302

na ca- vijñānapadaṃ brahmaparam, `vijñānaṃ brahma cedveda, tasmāccenna pramādyati, śarīre pāpmano hitvā sarvān kāmān samaśnute.' ityādivākyaśeṣāditi- vācyam, vākyaśeṣoktamumukṣujñeyaśuddhabrahmaṇo yajñakartṛtvāsambhavena kartṛtvena pratipādyamāne vijñāne tato'rthāntaratvaniścayād, `annaṃ brahmetyupāsta' ityetadvākyasamānayogakṣematvācca. `tatraivaṃ sati kartāramātmānaṃ kevalaṃ tu yaḥ. paśyatyakṛtabuddhitvāt na sa paśyatī'tyādi smṛteḥ `prakṛteḥ kriyamāṇānī'tyādismṛteśca. na cātmani svātantryeṇa kartṛtvaniṣedhabodhakatvamanayoḥ, sāmānyato niṣedhe bādhakābhāvāt. ata eva `dhyāyatīva lelāyatīve'tyādāvivaśabdaḥ. na cevaśabdaḥ paratantraprabhau prabhurivetivat jīvakartṛtve paratantratāmātraparaḥ tadvadatra bādhakābhāvāt. na ca- buddhyabhāve'pi ātmanaḥ kartṛtvaśravaṇād buddheḥ kartṛtvāsambhava iti- vācyam; buddheḥ kartṛtve janakatvamātre vā sarvathā tasyā jīvaniṣṭhatvenābhimatāyāṃ kṛtāvapekṣaṇīyatvena tadabhāve kartṛtvabodhakasya tavāpi mate upacaritārthatvāt, nirdharmakatvanirvikāratvaniṣkriyatvādibodhakaśrutivirodhācca. na ca- nirdharmakatvarūpadharmabhāvābhāvābhyāṃ vyāghātāt jñānatvasākṣitvādivat satyasyāsatyasya vā jñātṛtvāderapyātmanyeva sambhavācca nirdharmakatvaśrutirna śrūyamāṇārthapareti- vācyam, nirdharmakatvasya dharmābhāvarūpasya brahmasvarūpānatirekeṇa dharmatvābhāvena vyāhatyabhāvāt. yattvasatyasya satyasya vā jñātṛtvasyātmanyapi sambhava ityuktaṃ. tadiṣṭameva. na hyāropitamapi kartṛtvamātmani pratiṣedhāmaḥ. na ca- nirvikāratvaṃ dravyāntararūpatayā pariṇāmābhāvaparam, na tu viśeṣākārābhāvaparam,taccātmanaḥ kartṛtvādisattve'pyaviruddhamiti- vācyam, dravyāntararūpatayā pariṇāmaniṣedhakamapīdaṃ vākyaṃ nirdharmakaśrutyanusāreṇa viśeṣākāramātrasyaiva niṣedhaparam, sāmānyaniṣedhenaiva viśeṣaniṣedhaprāpteḥ. nāpi- niṣkriyatve kriyā parispando vā? dhātvartho vā? ādye iṣṭāpattiḥ, dvitīye ātmanyapi astyādidhātvartharūpasattādeḥ sattvenāsiddhiriti vācyam, brahmaṇa eva sadrūpatvena tatra sattāderapyabhāvāt, kriyāpadasya kṛtiparatvācca. ata eva manaso'bhāve suṣuptau kartṛtvādyadarśanam. na ca- tadāpi śvāsādikartatvaṃ dṛśyata eva, suṣuptau `bhūrbhūrityeva praśvasitī'ti śruteritivācyam, `na tudvitīyamastī'tyādi śrutyā taṃ prati śvāsasyaivābhāvena tatkartṛtvasya sutarāmasambhavāt. yadvā- kriyāśaktiprādhānyena prāṇātmakasyāntaḥkaraṇasya tadāpi sattvena tadupādhikakartṛtvasya tadāpi sattvāt. tathā ca śrutiranyaparā. darśanaṃ ca draṣṭravidyākalpitaśvāsādiviṣayam. idaṃ ca dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda eva samarthitam. `kāmaḥ saṃkalpaḥ' ityārabhya `hrīrdhīrbhīrityetatsarvaṃ mana eve'tyantā śrutirapi manasaḥ kartṛtvaparā, na tu manaso nimittatvaparā. na ca- `manasā vā agre saṃkalpayatī'tyādiśrutyā `ātmendriyamanoyuktaṃ bhoktetyāhurmanīṣiṇa' ityādi śrutyā ca manasaḥ karaṇatvamiti vācyam, manovyatiriktasya saṃkalpānāśrayatvena `manasā vā' iti śruterupacaritārthatvāt.

Nor should it be said that the word *vijñāna* refers to Brahman because of the supplementary passage: ‘If one knows *vijñāna* as Brahman, and if one does not deviate from that, having cast off evils in the body, he attains all desires.’ For since the pure Brahman to be known by the seeker of liberation, mentioned in the supplementary passage, cannot be the agent of sacrifice, it is ascertained that *vijñāna* taught as the agent is a different thing from it, and also because it shares the same logical status as the statement: ‘One meditates upon food as Brahman.’ This is also because of Smṛti texts such as: ‘That being so, whoever sees the isolated Self as the agent, because of an untrained intellect, he does not see,’ and ‘Actions are performed by *prakṛti*.’ Nor does this pair of texts teach the denial of agency in the Self only as acting independently, since there is no counter-evidence against a general denial. That is precisely why there is the word *iva* [‘as if’] in: ‘He meditates as if, he moves as if.’ And the word *iva* does not merely indicate dependence in the *jīva*’s agency, like ‘as if a master’ in the case of a dependent master, because unlike there, here there is no counter-evidence [to the primary sense of *iva*]. Nor should it be said that because agency of the Self is heard even in the absence of the intellect, agency of the intellect is impossible; for whether the intellect is the agent or merely the producer, in every way it must be depended upon for volition which is assumed to reside in the *jīva*, and therefore in its absence, any text indicating agency has a figurative meaning even on your view, and also because it contradicts Śruti passages teaching that [the Self] is devoid of attributes, devoid of change, and devoid of activity. Nor should it be said that the Śruti teaching attribute-lessness does not intend the heard sense because of the contradiction between the existence and non-existence of the attribute in the form of attribute-lessness, and because, just like consciousness and witness-hood, true or untrue knowership too can reside in the Self alone; for attribute-lessness, being the absence of attributes, is not non-distinct from the nature of Brahman and hence, not being an attribute, there is no contradiction. As for what was said—that either untrue or true knowership is possible in the Self too—that is indeed accepted, for we do not deny even superimposed agency in the Self. Nor should it be said that being devoid of change means the absence of transformation into another substance, not the absence of specific forms, and that this is not contradicted even if agency and the like exist in the Self; for this statement, although denying transformation into another substance, aims precisely at denying all specific forms in accordance with the Śruti on attribute-lessness, since a specific denial is obtained from a general denial itself. Nor can it be asked: Regarding activity-lessness, is activity motion or the meaning of a verbal root? If the former, it is an accepted conclusion; if the latter, it is unestablished because being, which is the meaning of verbal roots like ‘to be’ (*as*), exists in the Self too. For Brahman alone is of the nature of being, and hence even being and the like do not exist in it, and because the word ‘activity’ refers to volition. Precisely for this reason, in the absence of the mind during deep sleep, agency and the like are not observed. Nor should it be said that even then agency over respiration and the like is indeed observed, due to the Śruti regarding deep sleep: ‘He breathes out: “*Bhūḥ*, *bhūḥ*”’; for by Śrutis such as ‘There is not a second,’ respiration itself does not exist for it, and so agency over that is all the more impossible. Or rather, because the internal organ consisting of vital breath is present even then through the predominance of the power of action, agency conditioned by that adjunct is present even then. And thus the Śruti has another import. And the observation pertains to breath and the like projected by the observer’s ignorance. And this has been demonstrated in the doctrine of *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭi* itself. The Śruti beginning with ‘Desire, resolve’ and ending with ‘Modesty, intellect, fear—all this is only the mind’ also refers to the mind’s agency, not to the mind being merely an instrumental cause. Nor should it be said that the mind is an instrument because of Śrutis such as: ‘With the mind indeed he first resolves,’ and ‘Equipped with the Self, senses, and mind, he is the enjoyer, the wise say’; for since anything other than the mind is not the locus of resolve, the Śruti ‘With the mind indeed’ has a figurative meaning.