Sarvadarshanasangraha 1.46

1.46

tatra vidhyadhyavasāyapūrvakatvān niṣedhādhyavasāyasyopādhijñāne jāte tadabhāvaviśiṣṭasaṃbandharūpavyāptijñānaṃ vyāptijñānādhīnaṃ copādhijñānam iti parasparāśrayavajraprahāradoṣo vajralepāyate/ tasmād avinābhāvasya durbodhatayā nānumānādyavakāśaḥ/ dhūmādijñānānantaram agnyādijñāne pravṛttiḥ pratyakṣamūlatayā bhrāntyā vā yujyate/ kvacit phalapratilambhas tu maṇimantrauṣadhādivad yādṛcchikaḥ/ atas tatsādhyam adṛṣṭādikam api nāsti/

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible, i.e., a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, &c.[19]

The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, &c., to the knowledge of fire, &c., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, &c.

From this it follows that fate, &c.,[20] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adṛṣṭa, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause.