Sarvadarshanasangraha 10.10

10.10

nanu ṣaḍ eva padārthā iti kathaṃ kathyate/ abhāvasyāpi sadbhāvād iti cet — maivaṃ vocaḥ/ nañarthānullikhitadhīviṣayatayā bhāvarūpatayā ṣaḍ eveti vivakṣitatvāt/ tathāpi kathaṃ ṣaḍ eveti niyama upapadyate/ vikalpānupapatteḥ/ tathā hi/ niyamavyavacchedyaṃ pramitaṃ na vā/ pramitatve kathaṃ niṣedhaḥ/ apramitatve kathaṃtarām/ na hi kaścit prekṣāvān mūṣikaviṣāṇaṃ pratiṣeddhuṃ yatate/ tataś cānupapatter na niyama iti cet — maivaṃ bhāṣiṣṭhāḥ/ saptamatayā pramite ’ndhakārādau bhāvatvasya bhāvatayā pramite śaktisādṛśyādau saptamatvasya ca niṣedhād iti kṛtaṃ vistareṇa/

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, i.e., as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six positive categories,—and if others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a seventh category. But enough of this long discussion.