Sarvadarshanasangraha 11.16

11.16

vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropas tarkaḥ/ sa caikādaśavidhaḥ/ vyāghātātmāśrayetaretarāśrayacakrakāśrayānavasthāpratibandhikalpanākalpa-nālāghavakalpanāgauravotsargāpavādavaijātyabhedāt/

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,—or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the particular point in question,[5]—or by conflicting testimony. The thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a motive" (prayojana); this is twofold, i.e., visible and invisible. "An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[6] A "tenet" (siddhānta) is something which is accepted as being authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption" [leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major[7] (cf. Sūt. i. 39, and iv. 3); and this is of eleven kinds, as vyāghāta, ātmāśraya, itaretarāśraya, &c.