Sarvadarshanasangraha 11.30

11.30

tathā hi — ātmocchedo mokṣa iti mādhyamikamate duḥkhocchedo 'stīty etāvat tāvad avivādam/ atha manyethāḥ — śarīrādivad ātmāpi duḥkhahetutvād ucchedya iti tan na saṃgacchate/ vikalpānupapatteḥ/ kim ātmā jñānasaṃtāno vivakṣitas tadatirikto vā/ prathame na vipratipattiḥ/ kaḥ khalv anukūlam ācarati pratikūlam ācaret/ dvitīye tasya nityatve nivṛttir aśakyavidhānaiva/ anityatve pravṛttyanupapattiḥ/ vyavahārānupapattiś cādhikaṃ dūṣaṇam/ na khalu kaścit prekṣāvān ātmanas tu kāmāya sarvaṃ priyaṃ bhavatīti sarvataḥ priyatamasyātmanaḥ samucchedāya prayatate/ sarvo hi prāṇī sati dharmiṇi mukta iti vyavaharati nanu/

"But is not your definition of the summum bonum, liberation, i.e., 'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[13] why then is this continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the royal highway[14] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the Mādhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or (b.) something different therefrom? (a.) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyāyikas allow that cognition is evanescent,[15] and we do desire to abolish cognition as a cause of pravṛtti or action[16]], for who would oppose a view which makes for his own side? (b.) But if the latter, then, since it must be eternal,[17] its abolition is impossible; and, again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;" for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].