Sarvadarshanasangraha 11.45

11.45

na/ asiddheḥ/ nāpi sopādhikatvaśaṅkākalaṅkāṅkuraḥ saṃbhavī/ anukūlatarkasaṃbhavāt/ yady ayam akartṛkaḥ syāt kāryam api na syāt/ iha jagati nāsty eva tat kāryaṃ nāma yatkārakacakram avadhīryātmānam āsādayed ity etad avivādam/ tac ca sarvaṃ kartṛviśeṣopahitamaryādam/ kartṛtvaṃ cetarakārakāprayojyatve sati sakalakārakaprayoktṛtvalakṣaṇaṃ jñānacikīrṣāprayatnādhāratvam/ evaṃ ca kartṛvyāvṛttes tadupahitasamastakārakavyāvṛttāv akāraṇakakāryotpādaprasaṅga iti sthūlaḥ pramādaḥ/ tathā niraṭaṅki śaṃkarakiṃkareṇa —

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, &c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"—this pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words "by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the argument thus involves the fallacy called vyāpyatvāsiddhi].[35] Nor can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable to limitation by any suggested condition (upādhi),[36] [such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason "from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, &c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all. There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to the present case—