Sarvadarshanasangraha 12.42

12.42

kiṃ ca parameśvarasya līlāvigrahaparigrahābhyupagame 'py atīndriyārthadarśanaṃ na saṃjāghaṭīti/ deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭārthagrahaṇopāyābhāvāt/ na ca taccakṣurādikam eva tādṛkpratītijananakṣamam iti mantavyam/ dṛṣṭānusāreṇaiva kalpanāyā āśrayaṇīyatvāt/ tad uktaṃ gurubhiḥ sarvajñanirākaraṇavelāyām —

I shall now [says the Mīmāṃsaka] clear up the whole question. What is meant by this paurusheyatva ["derivation from a personal author"] which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (utpannatva) from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between us.[20] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established (a.) by inference,[21] or (b.) by supernatural testimony? (a.) The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Mālatīmādhava [which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause, "while they possess authority,"[22] [as supra, p. 188, line 21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.[23] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhākara] when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author—