Sarvadarshanasangraha 12.50

12.50

tad api śobhāṃ na bibharti/ gādivyaktibhede pramāṇābhāvena gatvādijātiviṣayakalpanāyāṃ pramāṇābhāvāt/ yathā gotvam ajānata ekam eva bhinnadeśaparimāṇasaṃsthānavyaktyupadhānavaśād bhinnadeśam ivālpam iva mahad iva dīrgham iva vāmanam iva prathate tathā gavyaktim ajānata ekāpi vyañjakabhedāt tattaddharmānubandhinī pratibhāsate/ etena viruddhadharmādhyāsād bhedasiddhir iti pratyuktam/ tatra kiṃ svābhāviko viruddhadharmādhyāso bhedasādhakatvenābhimataḥ prātītiko vā/ prathame 'siddhiḥ/ aparathā svābhāvikabhedābhyupagame daśa gakārān udacārayac caitra iti pratipattiḥ syān na tu daśakṛtvo gakāra iti/ dvitīye tu na svābhāvikabhedasiddhiḥ/ na hi paropādhibhedena svābhāvikam aikyaṃ vihanyate/ mā bhūn nabhaso 'pi kumbhādyupādhibhedāt svābhāviko bhedaḥ/ tatra vyāvṛttavyavahāro nādanidānaḥ/ tad uktaṃ ācāryaiḥ —

(b.) "But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not this recognition of g and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the species which exists the same in each, and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading'?" This objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual g's, there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species g; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand [the Naiyāyika doctrine of] the species g, the one species [in the Naiyāyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as short; so to the man who does not understand our [Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of] one individual g, the one g (in our view) will by the diversity of "manifesters,"[25] appear to him associated with their respective peculiarities; and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed [to the letter g], there is a fallacious appearance of distinction [between different g's]. But does this ascription of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between the g's], result (1.) from the nature of the thing, or (2.) from our imagination? There is no proof of the former alternative; for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between different g's, we should have to say, "Caitra has uttered ten g's," and not "Caitra has uttered the same g ten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction between g's, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, &c., that there is any inherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [i.e., "different" as applied to the g's] is really caused by the noise, which in each case is different. This has been said by the great teacher—