Sarvadarshanasangraha 13.38

13.38

atrocyate: pratyakṣam evātra pramāṇam/ gaur ity ekaṃ padam iti nānāvarṇātiriktaikapadāvagateḥ sarvajanīnatvāt/ na hy asati bādhake padānubhavaḥ śakyo mithyeti vaktum/ padārthapratītyanyathānupapattyāpi sphoṭo ’bhyupagantavyaḥ/ na ca varṇebhya eva tatpratyayaḥ prādurbhavatīti parīkṣākṣamam/ vikalpāsahatvāt/ kiṃ varṇāḥ samastā vyastā vārthapratyayaṃ janayanti/ nādyaḥ/ varṇānāṃ kṣaṇikānāṃ samūhāsaṃbhavāt/ nāntyaḥ/ vyastavarṇebhyo ’rthapratyayāsaṃbhavāt/ na ca vyāsasamāsābhyām anyaḥ prakāraḥ samastīti/ tasmād varṇānāṃ vācakatvānupapattau yadbalād arthapratipattiḥ sa sphoṭaḥ/ varṇātirikto varṇābhivyaṅgyo ’rthapratyāyako nityaḥ śabdaḥ sphoṭa iti tadvido vadanti/ ata eva sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphoṭo varṇābhivyaṅgyaḥ sphuṭati sphuṭībhavaty asmād artha iti sphoṭo ’rthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārtham ubhayathā nirāhuḥ/ tathā coktaṃ bhagavatā patañjalinā mahābhāṣye: atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdo yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇināṃ saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ iti/ vivṛtaṃ ca kaiyaṭena: vaiyākaraṇā varṇavyatiriktasya padasya vācakatvam icchanti/ varṇānāṃ vācakatve dvitīyādivarṇoccāraṇānarthakyaprasaṅgād ityādinā tadvyatiriktaḥ sphoṭo nādābhivyaṅgyo vācako vistareṇa vākyapadīye vyavasthāpita ityantena prabandhena/

Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as sphoṭa, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word. For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma:—Are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a sphoṭa by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this sphoṭa is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning. "It is disclosed (sphuṭyate) or revealed by the letters," hence it is called sphoṭa, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning," hence it is called sphoṭa as causing the knowledge of the meaning,—these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word 'cow' gauḥ? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The Vākyapadīya has established at length that it is the sphoṭa which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound, expresses the meaning."[20]

"But," say some, "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called sphoṭa? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it. You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception.