Sarvadarshanasangraha 14.43

14.43

yas tu parameśvaraḥ karuṇayā pravartaka iti parameśvarāstitvavādināṃ ḍiṇḍimaḥ sa garbhasrāveṇa gataḥ/ vikalpānupapatteḥ/ sa kiṃ sṛṣṭeḥ prāk pravartate sṛṣṭyuttarakālaṃ vā/ ādye śarīrādyabhāvena duḥkhānutpattau jīvānāṃ duḥkhaprahāṇecchānupapattiḥ/ dvitīye parasparāśrayaprasaṅgaḥ/ karuṇayā sṛṣṭiḥ sṛṣṭyā ca kāruṇyam iti/ tasmād acetanasyāpi cetanānadhiṣṭhitasya pradhānasya mahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmaḥ puruṣārthaprayuktaḥ pradhānapuruṣasaṃyoganimittaḥ/ yathā nirvyāpārasyāpy ayaskāntasya saṃnidhānena lohasya vyāpāras tathā nirvyāpārasya puruṣasya saṃnidhānena pradhānavyāpāro yujyate/ prakṛtipuruṣasaṃbandhaś ca paṅgvandhavat parasparāpekṣānibandhanaḥ/ prakṛtir hi bhogyatayā bhoktāraṃ puruṣam apekṣate/ puruṣo 'pi bhedāgrahād buddhicchāyāpattyā tadgataṃ duḥkhatrayaṃ vārayamāṇaḥ kaivalyam apekṣate/ tat prakṛtipuruṣavivekanibandhanaṃ na ca tadantareṇa yuktam iti kaivalyārthaṃ puruṣaḥ pradhānam apekṣate/ yathā khalu kaucit paṅgvandhau pathi sārthena gacchantau daivakṛtād upaplavāt parityaktasārthau mandamandam itaḥ tataḥ paribhramantau bhayākulau daivavaśāt saṃyogam upagacchetām/ tatra cāndhena paṅguḥ skandham āropitaḥ/ tataḥ paṅgudarśitena mārgeṇāndhaḥ samīhitaṃ sthānaṃ prāpnoti paṅgur api skandhādhirūḍhaḥ/ tathā parasparāpekṣapradhānapuruṣanibandhanaḥ sargaḥ/ yathoktam —

But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he act thus before or after creation? If you say "before," we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting at all], and on the other hand[13] that He compassionated after He had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent Nature [even without any intelligent superintendent]—in the order of the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,—is caused by the union of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not recognising its own distinction therefrom.[14] This final bliss [or absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[15] travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually dependent. This has been said in the Kārikā (§ 21)—