Sarvadarshanasangraha 16.1

16.1

so ’yaṃ pariṇāmavādaḥ prāmāṇikagarhaṇam arhati/ na hy acetanaṃ pradhānaṃ cetanānadhiṣṭhitaṃ pravartate/ suvarṇādau rucakādyupādāne hemakārādicetanādhiṣṭhānopalambhena nityatvasādhakakṛtakatvavat/ sukhaduḥkhamohātmanā'nvitatvādeḥ sādhanasya sādhyaviparyayavyāptatayā viruddhatvāt/ svarūpasiddhatvāc ca/ āntarāḥ khalv amī sukhaduḥkhamohā bāhyebhyaś candanādibhyo vibhinnaprat thatyayavedanīyebhyo vyatiriktā adhyakṣam īkṣyante/ yady amī sukhādisvabhāvā bhaveyus tadā hemante ’pi candanaḥ sukhaḥ syāt/ na hi candanaḥ kadācid acandanaḥ/ tathā nidāgheṣv api kuṅkumapaṅkaḥ sukho bhavet/ na hy asau kadācid akuṅkumapaṅka iti/ evaṃ kaṇṭakaḥ kramelakasyeva manuṣyādīnām api prāṇabhṛtāṃ sukhaḥ syāt/ na hy asau kāṃścit praty eva kaṇṭaka iti/ tasmāc candanakuṅkumādayo viśeṣāḥ kālaviśeṣādyapekṣayā sukhādihetavo na tu sukhādisvabhāvā iti ramaṇīyam/ tasmād dhetur asiddha iti siddham/

This theory of transformation deserves censure by those who rely on means of valid cognition. For insentient pradhāna does not act when not governed by a conscious being. Because when gold or the like is the material cause of a necklace or the like, governance by a conscious agent such as a goldsmith is observed, just like being produced is [incompatible with] establishing eternity. Because the reason—consisting in being co-present with pleasure, pain, and delusion—is contradictory, being pervaded by the opposite of the probandum; and because it is unestablished in its own nature. Indeed, these pleasure, pain, and delusion are internal, distinct from external sandalwood and the like which are experienced through different cognitions, and are directly observed. If these [external objects] were of the nature of pleasure and the like, then even in winter sandalwood would be pleasant. For sandalwood is never non-sandalwood. Likewise, even in summer smeared saffron paste would be pleasant. For that is never non-saffron paste. In the same way, a thorn would be pleasant to human beings and other living creatures, just as it is to a camel. For it is not a thorn only with respect to some. Therefore, particular things like sandalwood and saffron are causes of pleasure and the like only in relation to a particular time and the like, but they are not of the nature of pleasure and the like; this is the pleasing view. Therefore, it is established that the reason is unproven.