Sarvadarshanasangraha 16.37

16.37

na ca bhedenādhyastadehādinivṛttiḥ phalam ity aphalahetur asiddha iti veditavyam/ bhedagraho hi vyāpakanivṛttyā vyāpyanivṛttir iti nyāyena bhedāgrahaparipathinaṃ bhedasaṃskāram apekṣate/ anākalitakaladhautasya śuktiśakale tatsamāropānupalambhāt/ saṃskāraś ca pramitim ākāṅkṣati/ ananubhūte saṃskārānudayāt/ na ca bhrāntirūpo ’nubhavas tatkaraṇam iti bhaṇitavyam/ bhrānter abhrāntipūrvakatvena kvacit pramiter avaśyābhyupagamayitavyatvāt/ prayogaś ca: vimatāv ātmānātmānau bhedena pramitāv abhedāyogyatvāt/ tamaḥprakāśavat/ na cātmānātmanor abhedāyogyatvalakṣaṇo hetur asiddha iti śaṅkanīyam/ vikalpāsahatvāt/ tathā hi: anātmātmapariśeṣaḥ syād ātmānātmapariśeṣo vā/ ādye muktidaśāyām iva paridṛśyamānaṃ jagad astam iyāt/ dvitīye jagadāndhyaṃ prasajyeta/ tamaḥprakāśavad viruddhasvabhāvatvāc ca dṛgdṛśyayor ātmānātmanor abhedāyogyatvam avadheyam/ tataś cārthādhyāsānupapattau tatpūrvakasya jñānādhyāsasyāsaṃbhavena brahmaṇo vicāryatvāsaṃbhavād vicārātmikā caturlakṣaṇaśārīrakamīmāṃsā nārambhaṇīyeti pūrvapakṣe prāpte siddhānto ’bhidhīyate/

Nor should it be supposed that the cessation of the body and the like superimpositionally identified through difference is the fruit, and thus the reason 'being devoid of a fruit' is unestablished. For the apprehension of difference—according to the maxim that the cessation of the pervader entails the cessation of the pervaded—presupposes a latent impression of difference that opposes the non-apprehension of difference; for one who has never perceived silver does not superimpose it on a piece of mother-of-pearl. And a latent impression requires a valid cognition, since no latent impression arises regarding what has not been experienced. Nor can it be asserted that an experience having the nature of an error is the instrument thereof; for since error is preceded by non-error, a valid cognition must necessarily be admitted somewhere. And the syllogistic formulation is: The self and non-self under dispute are cognized as different by a valid cognition, because they are incapable of non-difference, like darkness and light. Nor should it be suspected that the reason characterized as 'incapability of non-difference between self and non-self' is unestablished, because it cannot withstand logical alternatives. To explain: does the non-self remain as the self, or does the self remain as the non-self? On the first alternative, the visible world would disappear, just as in the state of liberation. On the second, the universe would become blind [i.e., completely inert and devoid of awareness]. Moreover, because their natures are mutually opposed like darkness and light, the incapability of non-difference between the seer and the seen, the self and the non-self, must be acknowledged. And consequently, since the superimposition of an object is impossible, the superimposition of cognition preceded by it is impossible, and therefore Brahman cannot be an object of inquiry; hence the Śārīrakamīmāṃsā consisting of inquiry in four chapters is not to be undertaken—such being the prima facie view, the established conclusion is stated: