Sarvadarshanasangraha 16.54

16.54

na ca vijñānātmabhāṣiṇāṃ naiṣa doṣaḥ/ viśuddhasāvayavatvābhāvād iti gaṇanīyam/ yaḥ suṣuptaḥ so ’haṃ jāgarmīti sthiragocarasyāhamullekhasya kṣaṇabhaṅgivijñānagocaratve atasmiṃstadbuddhirūpamithyādhyāsasya tadavasthānāt/ tad anena kṛśo ’haṃ kṛṣṇo ’ham ityādīnāṃ prakhyātānānāṃ buddhyā sarūpatākhyānenaupacārikatvaṃ pratyākhyātam/ tadvyāpakabhedabhānāsaṃbhavasya prāg eva prapañcitatvāt/ tathā ca prayogaḥ:

Nor should it be considered that this defect does not apply to those who maintain that the self is consciousness on the grounds that it is devoid of physical parts. For if the reference to "I," which has a stable object in the cognition "I who slept am the very one who is awake," were to have a moment-destroying consciousness as its object, the false superimposition in the form of a cognition of that [self] in what is not that [self] would remain in the same state. Therefore, by this, the metaphorical nature asserted of familiar cognitions such as "I am thin" and "I am dark" by claiming their conformity with the mind has been refuted, because the impossibility of the appearance of difference, which pervades that, has already been explained in detail. And so there is the formal inference: