Sarvadarshanasangraha 16.83

16.83

yad uktaṃ siddhārthapareṣu kāryādhyāhāra iti tad ayuktam/ mukhyārthaviṣayatayā siddhe ’pi prayogasiddhāv adhyāhārānupapatteḥ/ yad uktaṃ śāstratvaprasiddhyā ca na svarūpaparatvam iti tad apy ayuktam/ hitaśāsanād api śāstratvopapatteḥ/ na ca prayojanābhāvaḥ/ śrutamatavedāntajanyādvitīyātmavijñānābhyāsena vidyodaye saṃsāranidānāvidyānivṛttyupalakṣitabrahmātmatālakṣaṇaparamapuruṣārtha-siddheḥ/ na cātra vidhiḥ saṃbhavati/ vikalpāsahatvāt/ tathā hi : kiṃ śābdajñānaṃ vidheyaṃ kiṃ vā bhāvanātmakam āhosvit sākṣātkārarūpam/ nādyaḥ/ viditapadārthasaṃgatikasyādhītaśabdanyāyatattvasyāntareṇāpi vidhiṃ śabdād evopapatteḥ/ nāpi dvitīyaḥ/ bhāvanāyā jñānaprakarṣahetubhāvasyānvayavyatirekasiddhatayā prāptatvenāvidheyatvāt/ aprāptaprāpakasyaiva vidhitvāṅgīkārāt/ tṛtīye sākṣātkāraḥ kiṃ brahmasvarūpaḥ kiṃ vāntaḥkaraṇapariṇāmabhedaḥ/ nādyaḥ/ tasya nityatvenāvidheyatvāt/ nāpi dvitīyaḥ/ ānandasākṣātkārarūpatayā phalatvenāvidheyatvāt/ tasmāj jñātavya ityādīnām avidhāyakatvād arhe kṛtyatṛcaś ca iti kṛtyapratyayānām arhārthe vidhānād arhārthataiva vyākhyeyā/ tathā ca sarveṣāṃ vedāntavākyānām upakramopasaṃhārādiṣaḍvidhatātparyopetatvān nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvabrahmātmaparatvam āstheyam/

As for what was said—that in passages concerning an established fact there is supply of an action—that is incorrect; because, when usage is established even regarding an established fact as its primary meaning, supplying [an action] is untenable. And as for what was said—that because of its well-known character as a scripture it cannot refer to the essential nature [of Brahman]—that too is incorrect; because its character as a scripture is established even by instructing what is beneficial. Nor is there an absence of purpose; for, through the rise of knowledge by the repeated contemplation of the non-dual self-knowledge born from the Vedānta passages that have been heard and reflected upon, the supreme aim of human existence—characterized by the state of being Brahman-Self marked by the cessation of nescience, the root cause of saṃsāra—is achieved. Nor is an injunction possible here, since it cannot endure alternative possibilities. To explain: is verbal knowledge to be enjoined, or that which consists of contemplative cultivation, or that which is of the nature of direct realization? Not the first; for it arises from the verbal text itself, even without an injunction, for one who knows the relations of word meanings and has studied the principles of linguistic logic. Nor the second; for contemplative cultivation, being the cause of the excellence of knowledge, is established by positive and negative concomitance and, being already obtained, is not something to be enjoined; because only that which conveys what is not already obtained is accepted as an injunction. On the third [alternative]: is the direct realization the essential nature of Brahman, or is it a specific transformation of the internal organ? Not the first; for, being eternal, it cannot be enjoined. Nor the second; for, being of the nature of the direct realization of bliss, it is the result and thus cannot be enjoined. Therefore, since words such as 'must be known' are not injunctive, and since kṛtya-suffixes are prescribed in the sense of fitness by the rule 'and kṛtya and tṛc suffixes in the sense of fitness', only fitness is to be explained as their sense. And thus, since all Vedānta passages possess the sixfold marks of purport such as beginning and conclusion, it must be maintained that they refer to the Self which is Brahman, whose nature is eternally pure, enlightened, and free.