Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.101

2.101

na hi vittisattaiva tadvedanā yuktā/ tasyāḥ sarvatrāviśeṣāt/ tāṃ tu sārūpyam āviśat sarūpayituṃ ghaṭayed iti ca/ tathā bāhyārthasadbhāve prayogaḥ: ye yasmin saty api kādācitkās te sarve tadatiriktasāpekṣāḥ/ yathā avivakṣati ajigamiṣati mayi vacanagamanapratibhāsā vivakṣujigamiṣupuruṣāntarasaṃtānasāpekṣāḥ/ tathā ca vivādādhyāsitāḥ pravṛttipratyayāḥ saty apy ālayavijñāne kadācid eva nīlādyullekhina iti/ tatrālayavijñānaṃ nāmāhamāspadaṃ vijñānam/ nīlādyullekhi ca vijñānaṃ pravṛttivijñānam/ yathoktam:

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of external things: Those things which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend upon something else than that thing; as, for instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or walking; and in like manner the presentments of activity under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as it has been said—