Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.44

2.44

na ca kaṇabhakṣākṣacaraṇādipakṣakakṣīkāreṇa sattāsāmānyayogitvam eva sattvam iti mantavyam/ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānām asattvaprasaṅgāt/ na ca tatra svarūpasattānibandhanaḥ sadvyavahāraḥ/ prayojakagauravāpatteḥ/ anugatatvānanugatatvavikalpaparāhateś ca/ sarṣapamahīdharādiṣu vilakṣaṇeṣu kṣaṇeṣv anugatasyākārasya maṇiṣu sūtravad bhūtagaṇeṣu guṇavac cāpratibhāsanāc ca/ kiṃ ca sāmānyaṃ sarvagataṃ svāśrayasarvagataṃ vā/ prathame sarvavastusaṃkaraprasaṅgaḥ/ apasiddhāntāpattiś ca/ yataḥ proktaṃ praśastapādena svaviṣayasarvagatam iti/ kiṃ ca vidyamāne ghaṭe vartamānaṃ sāmānyam anyatra jāyamānena saṃbadhyamānaṃ tasmād āgacchat saṃbadhyate anāgacchad vā/ ādye dravyatvāpattiḥ/ dvitīye saṃbandhānupapattiḥ/ kiṃ ca vinaṣṭe ghaṭe sāmānyam avatiṣṭhate vinaśyati sthānāntaraṃ gacchati vā/ prathame nirādhāratvāpattiḥ/ dvitīye nityatvavācoyuktyayuktiḥ/ tṛtīye dravyatvaprasaktiḥ/ ityādidūṣaṇagrahagrastatvāt sāmānyam aprāmāṇikam/ tad uktam:

Nor is it to be held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, that existence is a participation in the universal form existence; for were this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the universal) could have no existence.

Nor is the ascription of existence to universality, particularity, and co-inhesion dependent on any sui generis existence of their own; for such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many sui generis existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains, and so forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it. Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in its subjicible subjects? If it is everywhere, all things in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal), and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-pāda has said, "Present in all its subjects." Again (if the universal is present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the other, or not come from it? On the first alternative (if it comes), the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie qualities and motions); whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach itself to the new jar. Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another place? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to inhere in; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as you do); on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.

Conformably it has been said—