Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.76

2.76

grāhyagrāhakayor abhedaś cānumātavyaḥ/ yad vedyate yena vedanena tat tato na bhidyate yathā jñānenātmā/ vedyante taiś ca nīlādayaḥ/ bhede hi saty adhunānenārthasya saṃbandhitvaṃ na syāt/ tādātmyasya niyamahetor abhāvāt/ tadutpatter aniyāmakatvāt/ yaś cāyaṃ grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittīnāṃ pṛthag avabhāsaḥ sa ekasmiṃś candramasi dvitvāvabhāsa iva bhramaḥ/ atrāpy anādir avicchinnapravāhā bhedavāsanaiva nimittam/ yathoktam:

The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus: That which is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no identity to determine a constancy of connection, and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one. The cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without beginning and without interruption; as it has been said—