Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.93

2.93

tad ayuktam/ bāhyārthābhāve tadvyutpattirahitatayā bahirvad ity upamānokter ayukteḥ/ na hi vasumitro vandhyāputravad avabhāsata iti prekṣāvān ācakṣīta/ bhedapratibhāsasya bhrāntatve ´bhedapratibhāsasya prāmāṇyaṃ tatprāmāṇye ca bhedapratibhāsasya bhrāntatvam iti parasparāśrayaprasaṅgāc ca/ avisaṃvādān nīlatādikam eva saṃvidānā bāhyam evopādadate jagaty upekṣante cāntaram iti vyavasthādarśanāc ca/ evaṃ cāyam abhedasādhako hetur gomayapāyasīyanyāyavad ābhāsatāṃ bhajet/ ato bahirvad iti vadatā bāhyaṃ grāhyam eveti bhāvanīyam iti bhavadīya eva bāṇo bhavantaṃ praharet/

To this we reply (say the Sautrāntikas): This is untenable, for if there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such, and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity, like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were external," you must already suppose an external percipibile, and your own arrow will return upon you and wound you.