Sarvadarshanasangraha 3.54

3.54

tad apy asamīcīnam/ kāryatvasyaivāsiddheḥ/ na ca sāvayavatvena tatsādhanam ity abhidhātavyam/ yasmād idaṃ vikalpajālam avatarati/ sāvayavatvaṃ kim avayavasaṃyogitvam avayavasamavāyitvam avayavajanyatvaṃ samavetadravyatvaṃ sāvayavabuddhiviṣayatvaṃ vā/ na prathamaḥ/ ākāśādāv anaikāntyāt/ na dvitīyaḥ/ sāmānyādau vyabhicārāt/ na tṛtīyaḥ/ sādhyāviśiṣṭatvāt/ na caturthaḥ/ vikalpayugalārgalagrastagalatvāt/ samavāyasaṃbandhamātravad dravyatvaṃ samavetadravyatvam anyatra samavetadravyatvaṃ vā vivakṣitaṃ hetūkriyate/ ādye gaganādau vyabhicāraḥ/ tasyāpi guṇādisamavāyavattvadravyatvayoḥ saṃbhavāt/ dvitīye sādhyāviśiṣṭatā/ anyaśabdārtheṣu samavāyikāraṇabhūteṣv avayaveṣu samavāyasya sādhanīyatvāt/ abhyupagamyaitad abhāṇi/ vastutas tu samavāya eva na samasti/ pramāṇābhāvāt/ nāpi pañcamaḥ/ ātmādinānaikāntyāt/ tasya sāvayavabuddhiviṣayatve ´pi kāryatvābhāvāt/ na ca niravayavatve ´py asya sāvayavārthasaṃbandhena sāvayavabuddhiviṣayatvam aupacārikam ity eṣṭavyam/ niravayavatve vyāpitvavirodhāt paramāṇuvat/ kiṃ ca kim ekaḥ kartā sādhyate kiṃ vāneke/ prathame prāsādādau vyabhicāraḥ/ sthapatyādīnāṃ bahūnāṃ puruṣāṇāṃ tatra kartṛtvopalambhāt/ dvitīye bahūnāṃ viśvanirmātṛtve teṣu mitho vaimatyasaṃbhāvanāyā anivāryatvād ekaikasya vastuno ´nyānyarūpatayā nirmāṇe sarvam asamañjasam āpadyeta/ sarveṣāṃ sāmarthyasāmyenaikenaiva sakalajagadutpattisiddhāv itaravaiyarthyaṃ ca/

Not the first, because it would apply too widely, as it would include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is in contact with the parts of other things;] nor the second, because it would similarly include genus, &c. [as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor the third, because this involves a term ("produced") just as much disputed as the one directly in question;[13] nor the fourth, because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative:—Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to itself,—or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the former, it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the latter, your new position involves as much dispute as the original point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you mean by "something else." We use these terms in compliance with your terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its existence.

Nor can the fifth alternative be allowed, because this would reach too far, as it would include soul, &c., since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect.[14] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading, just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not all-pervading].

And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?

But the Naiyāyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all eternity he has been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," like other liberated persons,—since the use of the term "liberated" necessarily implies the having been previously bound; and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects, the earth, &c.? according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, &c., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar.'" This argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (i.) the being in contact with the parts; or (ii.) "the being in intimate relation to the parts; or (iii.) the being produced from parts;" or (iv.) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v.) the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?

In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend erroneously to palaces, &c., where we see for ourselves the work of many different men, as carpenters, &c., and [in the second case] if all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. As it has been said in the Vītarāgastuti, or "Praise of Jina"—