Sarvadarshanasangraha 10
English (machine translation) 10
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10.1
Here, indeed, every discerning person, wishing to abandon suffering—which is established by the self-experience of all beings as being inherently painful to experience—and desiring to know the means for its abandonment, contemplates direct realization of the supreme Lord as the means.
10.2
"When humans shall roll up space like a piece of hide,
10.3
then will there be an end of suffering without knowing Śiva."
10.4
—on the epistemic validity of an assembly of statements such as this. And direct realization of the supreme Lord must be cultivated through hearing, reflection, and contemplative cultivation. As he says:
10.5
"By scripture, by inference, and by the strength of the practice of meditation,
10.6
fashioning wisdom in three ways, one attains the highest yoga."
10.7
Among these, reflection depends on inference; inference depends on the knowledge of pervasion; and knowledge of pervasion requires the discrimination of categories. Therefore, the six categories were established by the venerable Kaṇabhakṣa in the treatise of ten chapters, beginning with: 'Now, therefore, we shall explain dharma.'
10.8
There, in the first chapter consisting of two daily lessons, an exposition of all the categories inhering [in reality] was made. There too, in the first daily lesson, there is the examination of what possesses a universal; in the second daily lesson, the examination of universal and particular. In the second chapter consisting of two daily lessons, there is the examination of substance; there too, in the first daily lesson, the definition of the specific elements; in the second, the exposition of space and time. In the third [chapter] consisting of two daily lessons, there is the definition of the self and the internal organ; there too, the definition of the self is in the first; in the second, the definition of the internal organ. In the fourth [chapter] consisting of two daily lessons, there is the investigation of the body and what is useful to it; here too, in the first, the investigation of what is useful to it; in the second, the investigation of the body. In the fifth [chapter] having two daily lessons, there is the exposition of action; there too, in the first, the consideration of action connected with the body; in the second, the consideration of mental action. In the sixth [chapter] possessing two daily lessons, there is the examination of dharma enjoined by the Veda; there too, in the first, the investigation of the dharma of gift and acceptance; in the second, the examination of the dharma appropriate to the four stages of life. In the seventh [chapter], of the same kind, there is the exposition of quality and inherence; there too, in the first, the exposition of qualities independent of cognition; in the second, the exposition of qualities dependent on it, and the exposition of inherence. In the eighth [chapter], there is the consideration of non-conceptual and conceptual perception as a means of valid cognition. In the ninth, the exposition of specific cognitions. In the tenth, the exposition of the divisions of inference.
10.9
In this regard, the procedure of this treatise is threefold: enunciation, definition, and critical examination. Now, if it is objected, "Given that division should be mentioned, resulting in a fourfold [procedure], why is a threefold [procedure] stated?"—do not think thus. Because division is of the nature of a specific enunciation, it is included in enunciation itself. There, enunciation is: "Substance, quality, action, universal, particular, and inherence: these are the six categories alone." What is the reason for this order? It is stated: Substance, which is primary as the locus of all categories, is enunciated first. Next, quality, because by its condition of qualityness it occurs in all substances. After that, action, because of its parity [with quality] in possessing a universal. Next, the universal, which resides in that triad. After that, the particular, which is a substratum of inherence. At the end, inherence, which remains.
10.10
Now, if it is objected: "How can it be said that there are only six categories, since absence also exists?"—do not speak thus, because what is meant is that there are only six positive entities, as objects of cognition that do not refer to the meaning of the negative particle. [The opponent asks:] Even so, how is the restriction that there are only six justified, since [such an] alternative is impossible? To explain: is that which is excluded by the restriction cognized by a means of valid cognition, or not? If it is cognized by a means of valid cognition, how can it be negated? If it is not cognized by a means of valid cognition, how much less so? For no sensible person attempts to negate the horn of a mouse. And therefore, because of impossibility, there is no restriction. If this is urged, do not say so, because there is the negation of being a positive entity in darkness and the like which is cognized as a seventh [category], and the negation of being a seventh [category] in causal efficacy, similarity, and the like which is cognized as a positive entity. Enough of prolixity.
10.11
There, the definition of the triad of substance and so forth is the universal consisting of substanceness and so forth. Substanceness is the state of inhering in the sky and a lotus, being eternal, and not inhering in odor. Qualityness is a universal directly pervaded by existence, inhering [in qualities] distinct from non-inherent causes that do not inhere in inherent causes. Actionness is a universal directly pervaded by existence along with non-inherence in eternal entities. The universal, however, is devoid of being a counterpositive of destruction and inheres in many. The particular is devoid of a universal that is opposed to mutual absence, and is inherent. But inherence is a relation devoid of inherence. In this way the definitions of the six are established.
10.12
Substance is of nine kinds: earth, water, fire, wind, ether, time, space, self, and mind. There, the definition of the four beginning with earth is the universal consisting of earthness and so forth. Earthness is a universal directly pervaded by substanceness that is co-referent with color produced by baking. Waterness is a universal that, while inhering in rivers and the ocean, does not inhere in fire. Fireness is a universal that, while inhering in the moon and gold, does not inhere in water. Windness is a universal directly pervaded by substanceness that inheres in the sense organ of touch. Because ether, time, and space are each single, and in the absence of a lower universal, there are three conventional names: ether, time, and space. Ether is the substratum of a particular [quality] that is co-referent with a produced specific quality not produced by contact. Time is the substratum of the non-inherent cause of posteriority that does not inhere in space, while being omnipresent. Space is that which is vast, has no specific qualities, and is not time. Selfness and mindness belong to self and mind. Selfness is a lower universal under substanceness that inheres in non-corporeal entities. Mindness is a lower universal under substanceness that inheres in an atom devoid of being an inherent cause of a substance.
10.13
Color, taste, odor, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, posteriority, priority, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort are the seventeen explicitly stated, and those combined by the word "and" are gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, the unseen, and sound, being just seven; thus there are twenty-four qualities. There, the definition of those beginning with color and ending with sound is the universal consisting of colorness and so forth. Colorness is a lower universal under qualityness that inheres in blue. In this manner the definitions of the remainder should be seen.
10.14
Action is of five kinds, owing to the distinctions of throwing upward, throwing downward, contracting, expanding, and going. Whirling, emptying, and so on are included in going alone. The definition of throwing upward and the rest is the universal consisting of upward-throwingness and so forth. There, upward-throwingness is a lower universal under actionness that inheres in the non-inherent cause of conjunction with an upper region. In this manner the definition of throwing downward and the rest should be formulated.
10.15
The universal is of two kinds: higher and lower. The higher is existence, which inheres in substance and quality. The lower is substanceness and so forth. Its definition has already been stated.
10.16
Because particulars are infinite and inherence is one, division is not possible. And their definition has already been stated.
10.17
Concerning the number two, and the production of qualities born of baking, and disjunction born of disjunction,
10.18
one whose intellect does not falter—him indeed they know as a Vaiśeṣika.
10.19
Because of the existence of such a traditional saying, the process of the origination of duality and the like is demonstrated. There, first is the contact of sense organ and object (1); from that, the cognition of the generic property of oneness (2); then the relating cognition (3); then the origination of duality (4); then the cognition of the generic property of duality-ness (5); from that, the cognition of the quality of duality (6); then the awareness that "there are two substances" (7); then the mental impression. Thus it is said:
10.20
First, through the occurrence of sense contact, the awareness of the generic property of oneness [arises];
10.21
from this arises the cognition whose domain is both onenesses; then duality is produced.
10.22
From that [arises] the valid cognition of duality-ness; and then after that, immediately after the valid cognition of duality,
10.23
the awareness that "there are two substances" [arises]. This is declared to be the process of the emergence of duality.
10.24
What is the means of valid cognition for duality and the like being produced by relating cognition? On this, the Teachers say: The relating cognition must be the generator of duality and the like, because—since its being a revealer is impossible—[duality and the like] conform to it; just as conjunction [is the generator] with respect to sound. But we say: Duality and the like are not revealed by a non-eternal cognition having two onenesses as its object, because they are qualities inhering in multiple things; like separateness and the like.
10.25
The order of cessation is explained: From the relating cognition, the cessation of the cognition of the generic property of oneness occurs simultaneously with the origination of duality. From the cognition of the generic property of duality-ness, the cessation of the relating cognition occurs simultaneously with the awareness of the quality of duality. From the cessation of the relating cognition, the cessation of duality occurs simultaneously with the awareness of substance. From the awareness of substance, the cessation of the awareness of quality occurs simultaneously with the origination of the mental impression. After that, from the mental impression, the cessation of the awareness of substance occurs.
10.26
And likewise are the summary verses:
10.27
First indeed, through the relating cognition, the awareness of the universal of oneness is destroyed,
10.28
simultaneously with the emergence of duality; and afterwards, that [relating cognition is destroyed] through the awareness of its universal.
10.29
At the time of the awareness of the quality called duality, duality then ceases
10.30
through the destruction of the relating cognition, at the time of the arising of the awareness of substance.
10.31
The awareness of quality [is destroyed] through the awareness of substance, at the time of the origination of the mental impression;
10.32
and the awareness of substance [is destroyed] through the mental impression: such is considered the sequence of destruction.
10.33
The means of valid cognition for a cognition being destroyed by another cognition and being destroyed by a mental impression is [the inference]: Cognitions under dispute are destroyed by subsequent effects, because they are momentary specific qualities of an all-pervading substance, like sound. In some cases, simultaneously with the action that produces the disjunction opposed to the conjunction producing the substance, through the cognition of the generic property of oneness, the cessation of duality occurs solely from the cessation of the substratum. Simultaneously with the action, from the cognition of the relating cognition, it occurs from both. This is in brief.
10.34
It should be understood that what is called "relating cognition" is a cognition whose counter-entity is the destruction of its destroyer.
10.35
Now, upon the inquiry as to in how many moments another dyad is produced and becomes possessed of color and the like, beginning from the destruction of a dyad, the process of origination is stated: The destruction of a dyad occurs through the sequence of impulse and the like. When the dyad is destroyed, the cessation of dark color and the like occurs in the atom from contact with fire. When the dark color and the like have ceased, the origination of red color and the like occurs from another contact with fire. When the red color and the like have originated, an action occurs in the atom to initiate a substance, from conjunction with a self possessing unseen merit or demerit. By that [action], disjunction from the previous spatial region occurs. Through the disjunction, the cessation of conjunction with the previous spatial region occurs. When that has ceased, the origination of conjunction with another atom occurs. Through the two conjoined atoms, the origination of a dyad occurs. When the dyad is originated, the origination of effect-qualities such as color and the like occurs from cause-qualities and the like. Thus in proper sequence there are nine moments. Another manner of ten moments and the like is not elaborated here for fear of prolixity. Such is the process of baking in the atom (pīlupāka). The process of baking in the whole vessel (piṭharapāka) is accepted by the mind of the Naiyāyikas.
10.36
Disjunction produced by disjunction is twofold: produced by disjunction of causes alone, and produced by disjunction of a cause and a non-cause. There, the first is explained: When an action arisen in a cause pervaded by an effect produces disjunction from another part, it does not then produce disjunction from a spatial region such as ether. But when there is disjunction from a spatial region such as ether, it does not then produce disjunction from another part: this is a fixed rule of situation. For the action's not being the producer of disjunction from the ether—by virtue of being the producer of a disjunction opposed to the conjunction producing a substance—is never found to deviate, just like smoke with respect to the class of fires. And therefore, the action of a part produces disjunction only from another part, not from a spatial region such as ether. From that disjunction comes the cessation of the conjunction producing the substance. Then, by the maxim that "from the absence of the cause comes the absence of the effect," the cessation of the whole occurs. When the whole has ceased, the disjunction existing in its two parts, which are its causes, dependent upon time characterized by the destruction of the effect or upon an independent part, produces a disjunction of only that part which possesses action from the ether-region conjoined with the effect, not of an inactive part, because of the absence of a cause.
10.37
The second, however, [is this]: an action arisen in a hand, not producing disjunction from another part, produces disjunctions from spatial regions such as ether. These disjunctions of cause and non-cause, dependent upon that direction toward which the action is inclined to produce an effect, produce a disjunction of effect and non-effect; as the disjunction between body and ether arises from the disjunction between hand and ether. And this is not an effect of the body's action, because at that time it is inactive; nor is it an effect of the hand's action, because an action located in a different substratum cannot produce a disjunction. Therefore, by residue, the disjunction of cause and non-cause must be accepted as its cause.
10.38
As for what was stated, that positive entityhood is negated with respect to darkness and the like, that is inconsistent, because fourfold dispute is possible regarding it. For instance: the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins say that darkness is a substance; Śrīdharācārya says it is an imposed blue color; a section of the Prābhākaras says it is the absence of cognition of light; the Naiyāyikas and others say it is the absence of light. If this is argued—
10.39
there, the position that it is a substance does not hold, because alternatives are impossible. Darkness, if it were a substance, would be either one among earth and the others, or something else. Not the first, for it would entail having as many qualities as that [substance] in which it is included has. Not the second, because since it lacks qualities, it cannot be a substance, and so its being a different substance is all the more impossible.
10.40
If it is objected: How could darkness, which is perceived as dark like a tamāla tree, be devoid of qualities?
10.41
That is without substance,
10.42
because blue color, which is pervaded by smell and the like, ceases upon their cessation.
10.43
Now, if it be asked: what is the status of the cognition, “Darkness is blue”?
10.44
[The answer is:] It is merely an illusion, like [the cognition] “The sky is blue”; enough with the burden of old arguments! For this very reason, darkness does not have an superimposed color, since superimposition is impossible without cognition of a substratum, and because the eye, lacking the auxiliary aid of external light, is not observed to have the capacity to superimpose color. Nor is this cognition non-ocular, since its conformity [to the functioning of the eye] is uniquely established. For this very reason, it is not an absence of the cognition of light, because, according to the rule that an absence is grasped by the same sense organ that grasps its counterpositive, this would entail that it is mental. Therefore, darkness is simply the absence of light.
10.45
Nor is it correct to say that it cannot be an absence because it is known through an affirmative cognition, for there are counter-instances in the cases of cosmic dissolution, destruction, cessation, and so forth. Nor is the superimposition of a positive property upon an absence difficult to establish, since the superimposition of pleasure upon the absence of pain and the notion of disjunction in the absence of conjunction are observed.
10.46
Nor must it be assumed that the absence of light, being an absence of something endowed with color like the absence of a pot and the like, must be an object of cognition produced by the eye depending on light; for according to the rule that the eye, in grasping the absence of something, depends on whatever it depends upon in grasping that thing, there is no dependence on light in the cognition of light, and therefore there is no dependence on it in the cognition of its absence either.
10.47
Nor is the apprehension of a substratum necessary, because it is not accepted that the apprehension of a substratum is necessary in the cognition of an absence; otherwise, the destruction of sound in [the cognition] “The uproar has ceased” would not be perceptible. Thus the opponent's statement lacks authority. Keeping all this in mind, the venerable Kaṇāda composed the sūtra: “Darkness is an absence, because its production is differentiated from that of substance, quality, and action.”
10.48
Now absence, which is knowable through a means of valid cognition that is negative in form, is explained as the seventh [category]: and it is non-inherence while not being an inherence. In brief, it is of two kinds, through the division into relational absence and mutual absence. Relational absence also is of three kinds, through the division into antecedent absence, destruction, and absolute absence. Among these, antecedent absence is without beginning and non-eternal. Destruction has an origin and is indestructible. Absolute absence is an absence whose substratum is [at all times] without the counterpositive. Mutual absence is an absence without limit, while being distinct from absolute absence.
10.49
Now, if it is objected that mutual absence is nothing other than absolute absence;
10.50
[We reply:] Oh, what an error on the royal road! For mutual absence is a negation whose counterpositive is identity, as in: “A pot is not of the nature of cloth.” Absolute absence is a negation whose counterpositive is a relation, as in: “There is no relation of color in air.” Nor should it be suspected that this [category of absence] has no utility for the aims of human existence, for it is the supreme aim of human existence as the highest good, which is synonymous with the absolute eradication of pain.
10.51
Thus ends the Aulūkya philosophical system in the Compendium of All the Philosophies.
Translations (1)
- The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English
Linked texts (1)
- Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit