Sarvadarshanasangraha 11

English (machine translation) 11

Language: English

11.1

That the highest good, characterized by the absolute eradication of pain, arises from knowledge of the truth, has also been established in the sister system. So says the author of the sūtras: “The attainment of the highest good results from knowledge of the truth regarding the means of valid cognition, the objects of valid cognition, and the rest.” This is the first sūtra of the Nyāya school. And the Nyāya school consists of five chapters. In it, there are two daily sections per chapter. There, in the first daily section of the first chapter, the venerable Gautama, having given the definitions of the nine categories beginning with the means of valid cognition, gave the definitions of the seven categories beginning with debate in the second. In the first [section] of the second [chapter], there is the examination of doubt and the refutation of doubts concerning the invalidity of the four means of valid cognition. In the second, there is the demonstration of the inclusion of presumption and the rest. In the first [section] of the third [chapter], there is the examination of the self, the body, the sense organs, and their objects. In the second, the examination of intellect and the mind. In the first [section] of the fourth [chapter], there is the examination of activity, defect, rebirth, fruition, pain, and final release. In the second, the demonstration of their being caused by defects, and the demonstration of the composite whole and the rest. In the first [section] of the fifth [chapter], there is the demonstration of the varieties of futile rejoinder. In the second, the demonstration of the varieties of grounds for defeat.

11.2

According to the principle that “the establishment of the object of valid cognition depends on the means of valid cognition,” since the definition must be stated in accordance with the first enunciation of the means of valid cognition, the definition of the means of valid cognition enunciated first is stated first: A means of valid cognition is that which is pervaded by true cognition while not being distinct from the locus of the instrument [of true cognition]. And in this way, the epistemic validity of the Supreme Lord, established as a doctrine peculiar to this school, is included. As the author of the sūtras said: “And its epistemic validity, like the epistemic validity of mantras and medical science, arises from the epistemic validity of the trustworthy person.” And likewise Udayanācārya, who has seen the opposite shore of the ocean of the Nyāya method and whose fame is world-renowned, also [says] in the fourth bunch of the Nyāyakusumāñjali:

11.3

“Valid knowledge is accurate discernment, and the possession thereof is the status of being a knower;

11.4

The exclusion of its absence is epistemic validity in the doctrine of Gautama.” So [he says]:

11.5

“In whom, perceptive, eternally connected, whose existence depends on no other medium,

11.6

the order of all suitable things has entered into an experience of real facts;

11.7

from whom any chaff of doubt has fallen away through the departure of the taint caused by even a trace of unseen merit or demerit;

11.8

what need is there of other [authorities] stained by the arising of doubt? Therefore, Śiva is my means of valid cognition.” So [he says].

11.9

And that is of four kinds, through the division into perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony.

11.10

Whatever appears in true cognition is the object of valid cognition. And that is of twelve kinds, through the division into: self, body, sense organ, object, intellect, mind, activity, defect, rebirth, fruition, pain, and final release.

11.11

Doubt is cognition of an indecisive nature. It is of three kinds, through the division characterized by common properties, unique properties, and conflicting assertions.

11.12

Purpose is that with reference to which people act. It is of two kinds, through the division into seen and unseen.

11.13

An example is the ground for the apprehension of pervasion. It is of two kinds, through the division into similarity and dissimilarity.

11.14

Established doctrine is a matter accepted as authoritative. It is of four kinds, through the division into doctrine common to all schools, doctrine peculiar to a school, hypothetical doctrine, and accepted doctrine.

11.15

A member [of a syllogism] is a constituent part of a sentence of inference for others. It is of five kinds, through the division into proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.

11.16

Hypothetical reasoning is the superimposition of the pervader through the superimposition of the pervaded. And it is of eleven kinds, through the division into: contradiction, circular argument, mutual dependence, vicious circle, infinite regress, counter-hypothesis, parsimony of hypothesis, extravagance of hypothesis, general rule, exception, and heterogeneity.

11.17

Decisive determination (nirṇaya) is valid knowledge, which is synonymous with veridical experience. It is of four kinds, through the divisions of perceptual realization, inferential knowledge, comparative knowledge, and testimonial knowledge.

11.18

Discussion (vāda) is a particular kind of debate whose fruit is the ascertainment of truth. Disputation (jalpa) is a debate between those wishing to conquer, having the establishing of both sides. Cavil (vitaṇḍā) is a particular kind of debate devoid of establishing one's own position. Debate (kathā) is the taking up of a thesis and counter-thesis by a proponent and an opponent.

11.19

A pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa) is that which, though inefficacious as a proof, is accepted as a reason. It is of five kinds, through the divisions of the erratic, the contradictory, the counterbalanced, the unproved, and the mistimed.

11.20

Quibble (chala) is a ground of objection through altering the signification of a word. It is of three kinds, through the divisions of altering primary denotation, intended meaning, and figurative usage.

11.21

A futile rejoinder (jāti) is an objection that is self-defeating. It is of twenty-four kinds, through the divisions of parity of similarity, dissimilarity, addition, subtraction, the questionable, the unquestionable, alternative, the to-be-proved, contact, non-contact, consequence, counter-example, non-origination, doubt, controversy, non-reason, presumption, non-difference, demonstration, perception, non-perception, eternal, non-eternal, and effect.

11.22

A clincher (nigrahasthāna) is an occasion for defeat. It is of twenty-two varieties, through the divisions of non-fulfilment of thesis, shifting the thesis, contradiction of thesis, renouncing the thesis, shifting the reason, shifting the topic, meaninglessness, unintelligibility, incoherence, mistiming, deficiency, excess, repetition, non-replication, ignorance, lack of ingenuity, evasion, admission of an opinion, overlooking the censurable, censuring the non-censurable, departure from an established tenet, and pseudo-reasons.

11.23

However, the particular details belonging to every subclass here, although clear in that treatise, are not set forth out of fear of prolixity.

11.24

Now, it may be objected: when sixteen categories such as the means of valid cognition are being taught, why is this designated as the treatise on Nyāya? True. Nevertheless, by the maxim that 'designations are made by what is specific,' the designation in that manner is appropriate because of the preeminence of Nyāya—which is another synonym for inference for the sake of others—inasmuch as it assists all branches of learning and serves as the instrument for undertaking all actions. Thus it was declared by the Omniscient One: 'This is the supreme logic (nyāya), because it is instructive toward a person who is in error, and likewise because it is the cause of purposeful action.' And by Pakṣilasvāmin: 'This science of inquiry (ānvīkṣikī), being divided into categories such as the means of valid cognition—

11.25

is the lamp of all branches of learning, the means of all actions,

11.26

the foundation of all duties; it has been examined in the enumeration of sciences.'

11.27

Now, it was said that highest good results from the knowledge of reality. In that regard, does highest good occur immediately after the knowledge of reality? The answer is no; rather, it is through the knowledge of reality, upon the successive cessation of pain, birth, activity, fault, and false knowledge, that liberation occurs as the consequence of the cessation of that which immediately precedes. There, false knowledge means the notion of the self in what is non-self, such as the body. Passion is toward what is favorable to that; aversion is toward what is unfavorable to that. In reality, however, there is nothing that is unfavorable or favorable to the self. And because passion and the rest are reciprocally linked: one who is deluded feels passion; one who has passion becomes deluded; one who is deluded becomes angry; one who is angry becomes deluded. Then, impelled by these faults, a living being commits prohibited actions: with the body, violence, theft, and the like; with speech, falsehood and the like; with the mind, malice toward others and the like. This sinful activity is demerit. With the body, [one performs] commended actions, such as charity, protecting others, and the like; with speech, beneficial and truthful words and the like; with the mind, benevolence and the like. This meritorious activity is virtue. Such is twofold activity. From that, corresponding to oneself, commended or condemned, comes birth, [namely] the reappearance of a body and the rest. When that exists, pain consisting of affliction occurs through being experienced as unfavorable. [For no one supposes that pain befalls one who is inactive.] These factors, beginning with false knowledge and ending with pain, proceeding without interruption—which is the meaning of the word saṃsāra—continue without limit like a water-wheel. When some foremost person, through the maturation of previously accumulated merit, sees all this by the teacher's instruction as an abode of pain and attended by pain, then he recognizes all of it as something to be abandoned. Then he desires to terminate its causing factor, nescience and the rest. And the means for its termination is the knowledge of reality. For someone contemplating the knowable divided into four [noble truths], knowledge of reality is born as that which is known by the term 'correct vision.' From the knowledge of reality, false knowledge departs. Upon the departure of false knowledge, faults depart. Upon the departure of faults, activity departs. Upon the departure of activity, birth departs. Upon the departure of birth, pain absolutely ceases. That absolute cessation of pain is liberation. The absoluteness of cessation means the non-recurrence therein of that which belongs to the same class as the eliminated. And so runs the aphorism of the supreme sage: 'Liberation is the successive cessation of pain, birth, activity, fault, and false knowledge, through the cessation of that which immediately precedes.'

11.28

Now, it may be objected: that liberation is the absolute eradication of pain still remains like [licking] molasses on one's elbow. Therefore, how can it be treated as something established?

11.29

It is not so; for this fact—that in the state of liberation there is the absolute cessation of pain—is a royal highway, being established as a doctrine common to all treatises among all proponents of liberation.

11.30

To explain: in the Mādhyamika view that liberation is the destruction of the self, so much at least is beyond dispute, that there is the eradication of pain. Now, you might think: 'Just like the body and the rest, the self also, because it is a cause of pain, is to be eradicated.' But that does not stand to reason, because the alternatives are untenable. Is the self intended to be the stream of consciousness, or something distinct from it? On the first alternative, there is no dispute. Who, indeed, performing what is favorable, would do what is unfavorable? On the second alternative, if it is eternal, its cessation is impossible to bring about at all; if it is non-eternal, purposeful activity is impossible. And the impossibility of worldly transaction is an additional flaw. Indeed, no discerning person strives for the total eradication of the self—which is dearest of all, in accordance with [the text], 'for the love of the self alone is everything dear.' For every living being, surely, speaks of one as 'liberated' only when the substrate exists.

11.31

In the doctrine of the Vijñānavādin that supreme attainment is the arising of immaculate cognition upon the cessation of the subject, there is an absence of causal totality and the impossibility of co-reference. For the fourfold contemplative cultivation is accepted as its cause. And on the doctrine of momentary destruction, since an enduring single substrate is impossible, that [cultivation], failing to attain culmination like practice in leaping and the like, is incapable of producing a clear recognition. Furthermore, if the afflicted stream of consciousness is the bound one and the unafflicted one is the liberated one, the co-reference that 'he who was bound is the very one who is liberated' does not hold.

11.32

Even the path accepted by the Jainas, that liberation is release from coverings, is not inherently unimpeded. Well now, being questioned, please explain: what is the covering? If you say it is merit, demerit, and delusions, that is indeed accepted. If [you say] the body itself is the covering, and accordingly liberation is the soul's perpetual upward ascent like that of a parrot released from a cage upon its cessation, then it must be stated: Is this self corporeal or incorporeal? On the first alternative, is it partless or possessed of parts? If it were partless, by succumbing to the definition of an atom that 'what is partless and corporeal is an atom', it would follow that the attributes of the self are beyond the senses like the attributes of an atom. If it has parts, then by force of the invariable concomitance that 'whatever has parts is non-eternal', upon succumbing to non-eternality, the destruction of what was done and the acquisition of what was not done would spread unhindered. If it were incorporeal, motion is utterly impossible, because action consisting of motion is invariably concomitant with being corporeal.

11.33

Even on the Cārvāka position that bondage is dependence and liberation is independence: if independence is the cessation of suffering, there is no dispute; if it is sovereignty, it is not accepted by discriminating people because it admits of degrees and equals.

11.34

Even on the position declared by the Sāṃkhya that liberation is the Puruṣa's abiding in its essential nature upon the cessation of Prakṛti when the difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is realized, the annihilation of suffering certainly exists. This alone remains [to be considered]: Does discriminative knowledge reside in the Puruṣa or in Prakṛti? There, it is not fitting that it resides in the Puruṣa, because it would entail the prevention of the Puruṣa's immutably eternal state. Nor is Prakṛti the substrate, because it is insentient. Moreover, is Prakṛti of the nature of activity, or of the nature of cessation? On the first alternative, there would be no liberation, because its nature cannot be lost. On the second, worldly existence would have set already.

11.35

Even on the view accepted by Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and others that liberation is the manifestation of eternal, unexcelled happiness, the cessation of suffering is certainly accepted. However, eternal happiness does not tread the path of means of valid cognition. If it is said that the Vedic revelation is the means of valid cognition there—no, because there is no scope for it when it is sublated by non-cognition of the qualified. For if there were scope, a floating stone would also follow to be such.

11.36

If it is objected: 'Having abandoned the position that liberation is the manifestation of happiness, the acceptance that liberation is merely the cessation of suffering makes one experience the taste of sour gruel, like a person afflicted with anorexia abandoning milk'—we ignore this assertion of yours as belonging to the realm of drama. For happiness is relegated to the side of suffering like honey mixed with poison, because it admits of degrees and equals, is besieged by many adversaries, is tormented by the solicitation of its means, and is invariably concomitant with suffering. If it is objected: 'On the maxim that one seeking to hold on to one thing lets go of another, happiness too is annihilated just like suffering, so this position is undesirable'—do not think so. For by the rule that the production of happiness is invariably attended by an abundance of causes of suffering, one would fall into equality with someone acting towards a red-hot iron ball under the impression that it is gold. For instance, among objects acquired by righteous means, how few are the fireflies of happiness, and how many are the rainy, gloomy days of suffering! But as for what will happen in the case of those acquired unrighteously, that cannot even be conceived by the mind. Let you, the best among the wise, acknowledge this, not concealing your own experience. Therefore, by residue, it is blameless that absolute cessation of suffering is the highest good for the foremost of men who has direct realization of the truth of the self through the sequence of hearing and so forth by virtue of the grace of the Supreme Lord.

11.37

If it is objected: 'Now, what is the means of valid cognition for the existence of God? Perception, inference, or scripture? First of all, perception does not proceed here, because [He] is beyond the senses, being devoid of color and the like. Nor is inference [the means], because there is no inferential sign pervaded by Him. Nor is scripture [the means], because it cannot withstand the dilemma: Does an eternal one make [Him] known, or a non-eternal one? On the first alternative, a departure from accepted tenets follows; on the second, mutual dependence follows. Comparison and the like cannot even be suspected, because they have restricted objects. Therefore, God is like a hare's horn'—

11.38

This does not produce any wonder in the minds of the discerning. The subject of dispute, such as mountains, oceans, and the like, has an agent, because of being an effect, like a pot. And this reason is not unestablished, because it is easily proved through its having parts.

11.39

If it is objected: 'Now, what is this state of having parts? Is it the state of being conjoined with parts, or the state of inhering in parts? Not the first, because it deviates in space and the like. Not the second, because of inconstancy in threadness and the like. Therefore, it is untenable'—

11.40

Do not speak thus, because the definition that 'having parts is being a substance that is inherent' can be stated, or because the inference of being an effect is easy by means of intermediate magnitude.

11.41

Nor is the reason contradictory, because there is no pervasion by the opposite of the property to be proved. Nor is it inconstant, because its occurrence elsewhere than the subject is not observed. Nor is it mistimed, because no sublater is apprehended. Nor is it counterbalanced, because no opposing counter-reason is seen.

11.42

If it is objected: 'Mountains and the like are devoid of an agent, because of not being produced by an embodied being, like space'—

11.43

This is seen to be incapable of enduring examination. For a fawn is not an opponent for a fierce lion. Because unproducedness alone is competent, the qualification 'by an embodied being' is useless.

11.44

If it is said: 'Then unproducedness alone is the proof'—

11.45

No, because [that reason] is unproven (asiddha). Nor can there be even a sprout of a stain of doubt regarding an extrinsic condition (upādhi), because a favorable hypothetical argument (anukūlatarka) is available: 'If this [world] had no agent, it would not even be an effect.' In this world, there is indeed no such thing as an effect that could come into being by disregarding the assembly of causal factors—this is beyond dispute. And all of that has its operational limit determined by a specific agent. Agency, moreover, is the condition of being the substratum of knowledge, desire to act, and volitional effort, defined as being the impeller of all causal factors while not being impelled by other causal factors. And so, upon the exclusion of an agent, since all causal factors determined by it are excluded, there would follow the production of an effect without a cause; thus [your objection] is a gross blunder. So it was formulated by the servant of Śaṃkara:

11.46

"When a probans (sādhana) is assisted by a favorable hypothetical argument,

11.47

no extrinsic condition (upādhi) can occur in the subject of inference (pakṣa), because its pervasion of the probandum (sādhya) is ruptured." So [it is said].

11.48

If you say: a host of unfavorable hypothetical arguments is awake [and active], such as 'If Īśvara were an agent, he would possess a body,'—

11.49

[we reply:] there is a contradiction whether Īśvara is proven or unproven. That was stated by Udayana:

11.50

"If verbal testimony and the rest are a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), there can be no negation [of Īśvara], because [the negation] is annulled.

11.51

If, however, they are fallacious, that very unprovenness of the locus (āśrayāsiddhi) would be irremediable."

11.52

Nor can a contradiction with the specific [character of Īśvara] be suspected, because it is defeated by the dilemma of [Īśvara] being known or unknown.

11.53

Let it be so; [yet] what purpose does the Supreme Lord have in undertaking the creation of the world? Is it for his own sake or for the sake of others? Even in the first case, is it for obtaining what is desired or for avoiding what is undesired? Not the first, for that is impossible for one whose every desire is already attained. For the very same reason, not the second. In the second case, undertaking [creation] is impossible: who indeed would describe someone acting for the sake of others as an intelligent agent? If someone were to say that undertaking [creation] is explained through compassion, one should counter him: then Īśvara would create all living beings solely happy, not variegated with suffering, because [creating suffering] contradicts compassion. For compassion is indeed the desire to remove others' suffering without regard for one's own interest. Therefore, Īśvara's creation of the world is not tenable.

11.54

That was said by the venerable Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila]:

11.55

"Not even a fool acts without aiming at a purpose;

11.56

and if he were not to create the world, what desired thing would fail to be attained by him?"

11.57

To this it is said: O crest-jewel of the heterodox (nāstika), close your eyes inflamed with jealousy for a moment and reflect! There is indeed an undertaking out of compassion. Nor does it follow that creation must by nature consist solely of happiness, because inequalities are explained by the specific maturation of good and bad deeds performed by the living beings to be created. Nor should an infringement of [Īśvara's] independence be suspected, for on the contrary, it is maintained according to the maxim that 'one's own limb does not become an obstruction to oneself.' Verbal testimony such as 'Rudra alone is one; no second stood [beside him]' is the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) in this matter. If you say: 'If that is so, then resolve the affliction of mutual dependence (parasparāśraya) that invalidates [it]'—

11.58

[we reply:] because it does not arise. Is mutual dependence suspected in origination or in cognition? Not the first: although verbal testimony depends upon Īśvara for its origination, origination is impossible for the Supreme Lord because he is eternal. Nor in cognition: although the Supreme Lord is cognized dependently on verbal testimony, that [verbal testimony] is known from another source. Nor in the cognition of its non-eternality, because the non-eternality of verbal testimony is easily understood through its possessing properties such as intensity and the like. Therefore, since the desired objective is attained upon obtaining the grace of Īśvara through the performance of dharma that turns one away [from worldly attachment], everything is lucid.

11.59

Thus concludes the philosophical system of Akṣapāda (Nyāya) in the Compendium of All the Philosophies.

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit