Sarvadarshanasangraha 14

English (machine translation) 14

Language: English

14.1

Now, while the doctrine of real transformation expounded by the Sāṃkhyas stands vigilant as an opponent, how could the doctrine of illusory appearance be respected? For this is their proclamation:

In brief, four categories are recognized in the Sāṃkhya system: some entity is primordial matter alone, some is both modification and primordial matter, some is modification alone, and some is neither.

14.3

Among these, mere primordial matter, denoted by the term 'pradhāna', is root-nature. It is not the modification of anything else. For according to the etymology 'it brings forth (prakaroti)' it denotes the state of equilibrium of the qualities of sattva, rajas, and tamas. Thus it has been said: 'Root-nature is not a modification.' Root-nature is that which is both root and primordial matter. It is the root of the collection of effects beginning with the great [intellect], but this pradhāna has no further root, because that would entail an infinite regress. Nor can it be said that there is no defect of infinite regress here as in the case of the seed and sprout, for there is a lack of means of valid cognition [to support it]—such is the purport.

14.4

And the entities that are both modifications and causes of further evolution are the great [intellect], the ego-sense, and the five subtle elements. Thus it has also been said: 'The seven beginning with the great [intellect] are both primordial matter and modifications.' The meaning of this is: the seven principles beginning with the great [intellect] are causes of evolution and modifications. Among them, the great principle, denoted by terms such as the inner organ, is the cause of the ego-sense, but it is a modification of root-nature. Likewise, the ego-sense principle, also known as self-assertion, is a modification of the great [intellect]. And that very ego-sense principle, when tamasic, is the cause of the five subtle elements, which are called subtle [principles]. That very same principle, when sattvic, is the cause of the eleven faculties—the sensory faculties known as eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; the action faculties known as speech, hand, foot, anus, and genitals; and the mind, which is of the nature of both. Rajas, however, has causality in both cases by generating activity, so it is not purposeless. Thus it was said by Īśvarakṛṣṇa:

14.5

Ego-sense is self-assertion; from it proceeds a two-fold creation:

14.6

The set of eleven faculties, and also the five subtle elements.

14.7

The sattvic group of eleven proceeds from the modified ego-sense;

14.8

The subtle elements proceed from the elemental ego-sense, which is tamasic; from the passionate ego-sense proceed both.

14.9

The sensory faculties are known as eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin;

14.10

They declare speech, hands, feet, anus, and genitals to be the action faculties.

14.11

Among them, the mind is of the nature of both, being deliberative, and is a faculty due to shared characteristics.

14.12

And this has been explained in the Tattvakaumudī by the master Vācaspati.

14.13

Modification alone, however, consists of the five gross elements beginning with space, and the eleven faculties. Thus it has been said: 'The group of sixteen, however, is a modification.' The meaning is: the group delimited by the number sixteen is modification alone, not primordial matter. Even though earth and the rest are the material cause of cows, pots, and the like, nonetheless, because these are not distinct principles from earth and the rest, they are not primordial matter. For here, being primordial matter is accepted as being the material cause of a distinct principle. There is no status as a distinct principle in the case of cows, pots, and the like, because their grossness and perceivability by the senses are identical [to that of the elements]. Among these, from the subtle elements of sound, touch, form, taste, and odor, together with each preceding subtle element, the five gross elements beginning with space arise in order, possessing one, two, three, four, and five qualities respectively. The creation of the faculties, on the other hand, has already been stated. Thus it has been said:

14.14

From primordial matter comes the great [intellect]; from that, the ego-sense; from that, the group of sixteen;

14.15

From five among that group of sixteen, the five gross elements arise.

14.16

The conscious subject is of neither nature. Thus it has been said: 'The conscious subject is neither primordial matter nor a modification.' The meaning is: the conscious subject is unchangeably eternal and immutable, neither the primordial matter of anything nor the modification of anything.

14.17

Three means of valid cognition are accepted as establishing these twenty-five principles. Thus it has also been said:

14.18

Perception, inference, and trustworthy testimony, because all means of valid cognition are established through them;

14.19

Threefold is the means of valid cognition accepted, for the establishment of the object of knowledge is through the means of valid cognition.

14.20

Here, regarding the relation of cause and effect, disagreement arises in four ways. The Buddhists maintain that the existent is born from the nonexistent. The Naiyāyikas and others maintain that the nonexistent is born from the existent. The Vedāntins maintain that the collection of effects is an illusory appearance of the existent and not real. The Sāṃkhyas, on the other hand, maintain that the existent is born from the existent.

14.21

Among these, the position that the existent is born from the nonexistent is not grounded in valid cognition, because that which is nonexistent and indefinable cannot be a cause, like the horn of a hare, and because there cannot be identity between the unreal and the real.

14.22

Nor is the nonexistent born from the existent, because for what is nonexistent prior to the causal operation, origination characterized by connection with existence is impossible, like the horn of a hare; for blue cannot be made yellow even by the most skillful person. If it is objected that existence and nonexistence are properties of the pot, that is incorrect, because the designation 'its property' is impossible when the possessor of the property is nonexistent, which would entail the existence of the possessor of the property.

14.23

Therefore, even prior to the causal operation, the effect is existent alone. And the manifestation of that which is existent is intelligible, as [the manifestation] of oil in sesamum seeds by pressing, and of milk in cows by milking. No example whatsoever is seen for a nonexistent [effect] in a cause. Moreover, is the cause connected with the effect as its producer, or disconnected? On the first alternative, the existence of the effect is established, because of the rule that connection belongs only to two existent things. On the latter alternative, all effects would arise from anything, since there would be no distinction in disconnectedness. This was stated by the Sāṃkhya teachers:

14.24

Because of nonexistence, there is no connection with causes that possess existence;

14.25

And for one who admits the origination of what is unconnected, there is no settled order.

14.26

Now, if it should be said: even unconnected, only that produces that toward which it has the capacity, and capacity is inferred from seeing the effect — that is not tenable. In the statement 'there is a capacity in sesame seeds to produce oil', if the oil were nonexistent, it is impossible to determine it as 'its capacity' through the dilemma of its being connected or unconnected. Moreover, because cause and effect are non-different, the effect does not exist separately from the cause. A cloth is not different from the threads, because it is an attribute thereof; what is not like this is not like that, just as a cow [is different from] a horse; and the cloth is an attribute thereof; therefore, it is not an entity distinct [from them].

14.27

If it is objected: 'Then each one individually should perform the function of covering,' we say no,

14.28

because those whose state as a cloth has become manifest by a difference of arrangement are demonstrated to perform the causal efficacy of covering. For just as the limbs of a tortoise, withdrawing into the body of the tortoise, disappear, and issuing forth, appear, even so specific modifications, such as the cloth, issuing forth from the cause such as threads, appearing, are said to be 'produced', and withdrawing, disappearing, are said to be 'destroyed'; but there is no production of what is nonexistent, nor destruction of what is existent. As has been stated in the Bhagavadgītā:

14.29

"Of the nonexistent there is no being; of the existent there is no non-being."

14.30

And therefore, from inference based on the effect, the primary principle is established. So it has been said:

14.31

"Because of the non-production of the nonexistent, because of the grasping of the material cause, because of the impossibility of everything [coming from everything],

14.32

because the capable produces only that which is possible, and because of the nature of the cause, the effect is existent." [Sāṅkhyakārikā 9]

14.33

Nor is the manifold world an apparent transformation of the existent principle of Brahman, because there is no perception of sublation, and because an illusory superimposition is impossible, as the substratum and the superimposed—consciousness and the insentient—lack similarity, unlike [the case of] silver and mother-of-pearl.

14.34

And hence, for the manifold world, which is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and delusion, a cause of such a nature must be determined. And so runs the formal inference: The totality of entities in dispute has a cause consisting of pleasure, pain, and delusion, because it is accompanied by them. Whatever is accompanied by something has that as its cause, just as a necklace or the like, being accompanied by gold, has gold as its cause; and this is such; therefore, it is so. There, regarding that cause of the world, that which is of the nature of pleasure is sattva; that which is of the nature of pain is rajas; and that which is of the nature of delusion is tamas; thus is established a cause consisting of the three qualities. To explain: Individual entities are experienced as possessing the three qualities. For instance, in the case of Maitra's wife, Satyavatī, pleasure arises in Maitra, because of the manifestation of the quality of sattva toward him; pain [arises] in her co-wives, because of the manifestation of the quality of rajas toward them; and delusion arises in Caitra, who cannot obtain her, because of the manifestation of the quality of tamas toward him. Similarly, another thing, like a pot, when obtained, produces pleasure; being stolen by others, it causes pain; and to an indifferent person, it presents itself as an object of indifference. Indifference indeed is delusion, since the word 'delusion' is derived from the verbal root 'muh', meaning 'distraction/unconsciousness', because in objects of indifference mental activity does not arise. Therefore, the whole host of entities is understood to consist of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and to have as its cause the primary principle endowed with the three qualities. So it is heard in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad:

14.35

"The one unborn, red, white, and black,

14.36

producing many offspring of like form,

14.37

one unborn [male], loving, lies by her,

14.38

while another unborn [male] abandons her who has been enjoyed."

14.39

Here, the words 'red', 'white', and 'black', by sharing the common characteristics of coloring, illuminating, and obstructing, are intended to convey the triad of qualities: rajas, sattva, and tamas.

14.40

Now, it may be objected: The insentient primary principle, unpresided over by a conscious being, does not engage in effects such as the intellect. Therefore, there must be some conscious ruler. And so the supreme Lord, who beholds all objects, would have to be accepted. If this is urged, it is incorrect, because the activity of the primary principle, even though insentient, is explicable by force of a purpose. And the insentient, unpresided over by a conscious being, is seen to operate for an aim of human existence: just as insentient milk functions for the growth of the calf, and just as insentient water functions for the benefit of the world, so insentient primal matter too will operate for the liberation of the person. So it has been said:

14.41

"Just as the activity of insentient milk is for the purpose of the growth of the calf,

14.42

so the activity of the primary principle is for the purpose of the liberation of the person." [Sāṅkhyakārikā 57]

14.43

As for the drum beaten by the advocates of the existence of the supreme Lord, asserting that the supreme Lord acts out of compassion, that has suffered a miscarriage, because the dilemma is unsustainable: Does he act prior to creation, or at a time subsequent to creation? On the first alternative, because there is no body and the like, pain does not arise, and therefore a desire to remove the pain of living beings is impossible. On the second alternative, there is the consequence of mutual dependence: creation is due to compassion, and compassion is due to creation. Therefore, the transformation into the form of the intellect and so forth of the primary principle, even though insentient and unpresided over by a conscious being, is prompted by an aim of human existence and caused by the conjunction of the primary principle and the person. Just as, by the mere proximity of a magnet, though inactive, the activity of iron occurs, so by the mere proximity of the person, though inactive, the activity of the primary principle is appropriate. And the relation between primal matter and the person, like that of the lame and the blind, is based on mutual dependence. For primal matter depends on the person as an enjoyer to be its object of enjoyment; the person too, warding off the three kinds of pain belonging to the intellect because of reflection upon it through non-apprehension of difference, depends on isolation; that is based on the discrimination between primal matter and the person, and it is impossible without that [primal matter]; hence, for the sake of isolation, the person depends on the primary principle. Just as two men, one lame and one blind, travelling with a caravan along a road, abandoned by the caravan due to a calamity caused by fate, wandering slowly hither and thither, agitated by fear, should come together by the force of destiny, and there the lame man is mounted on the shoulder of the blind man; then, along the path indicated by the lame man, the blind man reaches the desired destination, and the lame man also, mounted upon his shoulder [reaches it]; even so, creation is based on the primary principle and the person who depend mutually on each other. As has been stated:

14.44

"For the person's perception [of matter], and likewise for the isolation of the primary principle,

14.45

a relation exists between both, like that between the lame and the blind; creation is brought about by that." [Sāṅkhyakārikā 21]

14.46

Now, it may be objected: let the activity of primordial nature be caused by the aim of human existence; but how is her cessation accounted for? In response, it is said: Just as an unchaste woman whose faults have been seen by her husband does not approach her husband again, or just as a dancer departs once her purpose is accomplished, so too does primordial nature. As it is said:

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit