Karmanirnaya p11

p11

Nor is it unestablished that there is Īśvara and the like on the ground that a sentence has no validity regarding an established fact; for there is no injunctive obligation over and above an established fact. Rather, the meaning of the optative affix and the like is simply being the means to a desired end. Indeed, so-called being-to-be-done is not anything other than being the means to a desired end, because there is no means of valid cognition for it; and it has been stated that verbal testimony does not express that. Since the optative affix and the like are completely purposeful by merely meaning the means to a desired end, assuming an injunctive obligation other than that entails undue theoretical heaviness. And there is nothing that warrants such an assumption. Furthermore, in the case of disagreement, another means of valid cognition must be stated in its absence; and it is not inference, because its qualification is unestablished; nor is it postulation, because there is no unaccountability. By the very non-existence of an injunctive obligation, the claim that semantic derivation is in that which is connected with an injunction is refuted from afar. When one asserts, ‘Semantic derivation is in that which is connected with an injunction,’ what is the answer if it is said, ‘Semantic derivation is in that which is not connected with an injunction’? If an elliptical supply is claimed, the answer is elision. Rather than the elision of the meaning of all the established words, the elision of merely the meaning of the optative affix and the like is far preferable; for the semantic derivation of children occurs with respect to an established fact alone, as in ‘You laugh,’ ‘I laugh,’ and so on; and because it is obtained first, there is no reason to abandon it, and also because semantic derivation is seen to happen in that very manner.
Therefore, since validity regarding an established fact is established, Viṣṇu’s possession of great qualities is established.