Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p8.1

4.2.p8.1

ityādiṣu| kena punaḥ pramāṇenāyaṃ niyamo'vagamyate kāryakāraṇabhāvādvā svabhāvādveti kecit| tadayuktam| akāryakāraṇātadākārātmanāṃ kṛttikārohiṇyudayādīnāṃ niyamābhāvaprasaṅgāt| api ca | paurvāparyaniyama eva kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ kathaṃ ca niyama eva niyame pramāṇam ātmāśrayadoṣāpatteḥ| api ca kāryasvabhāvayoreva kiṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣeṇa tāvatsāhityamātraṃ gamyate na tatkāryatā dhūmasyāvasīyataiti cenna| sa khalu yatra dṛśyate tatra tasyāstitā yatra na dṛśyate tatra nāstitvaṃ gamyate| kāryatā tu kutaḥ| tasmātkāryakāraṇabhāvasyaivāpramāṇakatvānna tannibandhanaṃ niyamāvadhāraṇamavakalpate| tatasvabhāvatā cāprāmāṇikyeva | śiṃśapā hi vṛkṣātmikā kacidṛṣṭā'pi na tatsvābhāvyena niyantuṃ śakyate tanmātrānubandhitvāttatsvabhāvatāyāḥ| na ca śiṃśapāmātrānubandhi vṛkṣatvamiti kiñcitpramāṇamasti| satyapi sahopalambhe vṛkṣatvasya vyabhicārasaṃbhavāt| na śiṃśapātvasya kvacid vyabhicāro dṛṣṭa iti cettathā'pi deśāntare kālāntare vā vyabhicārasaṃbhavātsandehānivṛttiḥ| tanna svabhāvato niyamasiddhiḥ| kecittu mānasapratyakṣaṃ niyamamācakṣate| tadayuktaṃ manaso bahirasvātantryāt| bhūyodarśanasahāyaṃ bahiḥ pravartsyatīti cenna| dehābahirbhāvāt| na khalvakṣajatvamātraṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam anumānāderapi liṅgādisahitamanojanyatayā pratyakṣatā mā bhūd indriyārthasaṃprayogajaṃ pratyakṣaṃ caturvidhaśca saṃprayogaḥ saṃyogāddravyagrahaṇaṃ saṃyuktasamavāyād gumakarmasāmānyānām| saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyād guṇatvādīnām| tatsamavāyād guṇatvādigatasattāgrahaṇam|

—in passages such as these. By what means of knowledge, then, is this restriction apprehended? Some say: either from causality or from essential identity. That is incorrect, because it would entail that there is no restriction in instances like the rising of Kṛttikās and Rohiṇī, which are neither cause and effect nor identical in nature. Moreover, causality is nothing other than a restriction of prior and posterior sequence; and how can a restriction itself be the means of knowledge for a restriction, as this would incur the fault of self-dependence? Furthermore, what means of knowledge is there for effect and essential identity themselves? If it is said that through perception only mere coexistence is apprehended, not the fact that smoke is its effect—this is not true. For where it is seen, its presence there is apprehended; where it is not seen, its absence is apprehended. But whence [is its] effect-status [known]? Therefore, because causality itself lacks a means of knowledge, determining a restriction based on it is untenable. And essential identity is completely unsupported by any means of knowledge. For even though a śiṃśapā is seen somewhere to be of the nature of a tree, it cannot be restricted by being of its essence, because being of its essence entails an invariable attachment to that alone. And there is no means of knowledge showing that tree-ness is attached to śiṃśapā alone, since even when there is simultaneous perception, tree-ness can deviate [from it]. If it is said that deviation of śiṃśapā-ness is never observed anywhere, even so, doubt is not dispelled because deviation is possible in another place or at another time. Therefore, restriction is not established from essential identity. Some, however, declare restriction to be [grasped by] mental perception. That is incorrect, because the mind has no independent functioning externally. If it is said that it can function externally with the aid of repeated observation, that is not so, because it does not go outside the body. For mere arising from a sense organ is not the definition of perception; otherwise, inference and so forth, being produced by the mind assisted by the inferential sign and so forth, would also be perceptions. Perception arises from the contact of sense organ and object, and that contact is of four kinds: apprehension of substance from conjunction; of qualities, actions, and universals from inherence in the conjoined; of quality-ness and so forth from inherence in that which inheres in the conjoined; and apprehension of existence residing in quality-ness and so forth from inherence in that.