Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p8.3

4.2.p8.3

api ca yacchabdāśrayatvenābhimataṃ vyoma tatpratyakṣamapratyakṣaṃ va syāt| pratyakṣatve tenaiva locanaikagocareṇa dravyabhūtena hetorvyabhicāraḥ| apratyakṣatve sati tasya sapratisādhanatvam| na hyapratyakṣaguṇatvaṃ pratyakṣa śabdasay saṃbhavati śakyataeva hi prayoktuṃ śabdo na guṇaḥ pratyakṣadravyaguṇatvarahitatve sati pratyakṣatvāt ghaṭavaditi| tasmādyuktamasya dravyatve saṃyogād grahaṇamiti caturarvidha eva sannikarṣa iti bāhyen manasaḥ sannikarṣābhāvāt na mānasapratyakṣaviṣayatvaṃ niyamasya dhūmādivartinḥ sambhavati| tatra pramāṇāntaramidaṃ bhūyodarśanasahāyamanojanyaṃ liṅgādisahitamanojanyajñānādivatprasajyeta| taccāniṣṭaṃ pramāṇaṣaṭkābhidhāyinām| kaścittu bahirindriyaviṣayameva niyamamicchati| sa hi manyate vanhidhūmayoḥ sambandho deśakālānavacchinna eva pratyakṣeṇāvagamyataiti| nanu sannihitadeśakālaviṣayatvātpratyakṣasya tadavacchinna eva saṃyogaḥ| naivam| idantā hi sannihitadeśakālāvacchedaḥ sa ca dravyayorevāvagamyate na saṃyogasya saṃyuktāviti hi pratītiḥ na punarayamanayoḥ saṃyoga iti tasmāddeśakālābhyāṃ saṃyogo na ca dravyamevāvacchidyate na tu saṃyogasya deśakālāvavacchedakau| tenānavacchinnaḥ saṃbandho dhūmamātrānuyāyīti niścīyate tataśca dhūmasattaiva deśakālāntarādau pramāṇamapekṣate| na tvagnisaṃyogastasya pūrvamevāvagatatvāt| agnestu dhūmsaṃyuktasyāpi daṣṭasya kva cidvayabhicāradrarśanādārdendhanādyupādhikṛto'sya dhūmasaṃyogo na svābhāvikaḥ dhūmasya tu tādṛśopādhyadarśanāt svābhāvikamagnisaṃbandhitvaṃ niyataṃ bhavati| na hi svābhāvikaṃ vyabhicaratīti|

Moreover, the space assumed to be the substrate of sound must be either perceptible or imperceptible. If it is perceptible, the reason deviates on account of that very [space], which is a substance accessible to the eye alone. If it is imperceptible, it is counter-balanced; for it is not possible that an imperceptible [substance] should have a perceptible quality, sound. Indeed, one can formulate [the counter-inference]: 'Sound is not a quality, because, while being devoid of the qualityhood of a perceptible substance, it is perceptible, like a pot.' Therefore, its apprehension through contact is proper when it is a substance; and so, relation is indeed fourfold. Thus, because there is no relation of the mind with an external object, the invariable relation residing in smoke and the like cannot be an object of mental perception. In that case, this [cognition] would follow as another means of valid cognition—one produced by the mind assisted by repeated observation, like the knowledge produced by the mind assisted by an inferential sign and the like. And that is unacceptable to those who assert six means of valid cognition. But someone holds that the invariable relation is an object of the external sense organs alone. For he thinks that the relation between fire and smoke is apprehended by perception as simply undelimited by space and time. Objection: Since perception has as its object proximate space and time, the contact is delimited only by them. Reply: It is not so. For 'this-ness' is the delimitation by proximate space and time, and that is apprehended only of the two substances, not of the contact; for the cognition is 'these two are connected', not 'this contact is between these two.' Therefore, contact is not delimited by space and time, but rather the substances alone are; space and time are not delimiters of the contact. Hence it is determined that the undelimited relation belongs to smoke alone, and consequently it is only the existence of smoke that requires a means of valid cognition with respect to another space and time, etc., but not its contact with fire, because that has already been apprehended. But in the case of fire, although it is seen connected with smoke, since deviation is observed somewhere, its contact with smoke is caused by an extrinsic condition such as wet fuel, and is not intrinsic; but in the case of smoke, since no such extrinsic condition is observed, its relation to fire is intrinsic and invariable. For what is intrinsic does not deviate.