Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.4
English (machine translation) (mt) 4.4
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4.4
The author of the Vārttika himself showed the means of knowledge,
by the statement that invariable concomitance is cognizable through repeated observation.
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For the previous paths were not straightforward, resorted to great hardship, were not based on experience, and were adopted out of mere insolence through the principle of 'the recourse of the resourceless'. This restricted smoke
Because this [view] resorts to an awareness of the nature of a conjecture, such as "Surely this smoke is accompanied by fire," which is contradicted by experience; and there is this straight path: the restriction is knowable through repeated observation. But what is this means of knowledge called repeated observation? It is not possible to state this by restricting it to a single one; rather, through whichever among perception and the rest the repeated co-occurrence of the mark with the marked is known, that very thing, aided by the non-observation of counter-instances, becomes the means of knowledge for the restriction. Objection: Through repeated observations, co-occurrence is known in this or that place, but coexistence everywhere is hard for living beings to attain. Even from the non-observation of counter-instances, absence is known merely in proximate counter-instances, but exclusion from all counter-instances is indeed hard to attain, because there is no non-observation of the perceptible [in distant cases];
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and because absence is not established through mere non-observation. So how can the restriction, which consists in invariable concomitance across all space and time, be knowable through repeated observation? And this very doubt was raised by the Teacher himself when he said:
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"For the positive concomitance of the pervader with each pervaded is not seen;
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for it could be obtained only endlessly by origins such as perception."
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Likewise:
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"The status of a reason is indeed not understood by [mere] absence from a counter-instance."
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The meaning is that the absence from all counter-instances is not obtained. And here the justification was stated: "[the mark] indicates its co-occurring [property] merely through its non-perception there"; "there" means in a counter-instance. This is what is meant: grant that the absence of the mark from all counter-instances is not established, yet non-observation of the mark in counter-instances certainly exists, and by that much the observed co-occurring smoke or the like indicates the co-occurring fire or the like. As for what was said—that even co-occurrence everywhere is difficult to observe—the answer was also given there:
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"As to what is said: 'Co-occurrence everywhere is hard
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to see'—granted, not everywhere; it is certainly seen in two or three [places].
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When co-occurrence of fire and smoke is established due to limited space,
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or from the non-observation of negative divergence, the capacity to indicate is assumed."
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This is the meaning: granted that co-occurrence is not observed everywhere, but observation in two or three places is easy to do. And by that much, so long as no counterexample is observed, inference occurs. For if a restriction consisting in invariable concomitance across all space and time were accepted by us as an auxiliary of inference, then there would be an objection. But this is not stated by us; rather, wherever smoke and the like has been observed, in all those places there is invariably co-occurrence with fire and the like, and non-observation in non-fire—just this much is the cause in the arising of inference. For it is just this much of smoke that indicates fire to ordinary people; it does not depend on an apprehension of positive and negative concomitance across all instances and counter-instances, by which the means of knowledge would become unattainable. Therefore, the statement of restriction is not with reference to all space and time; rather, whatever restriction of the mark's co-occurrence with the marked exists in the observed places and times, that alone is called the restriction. Therefore, just that is an auxiliary of inference. And that is easily accessible through repeated observations alone; hence, the restriction of co-occurrence with the marked is not an invalid means of knowledge. As he said:
"It indicates its co-occurring [property] merely through the observation of co-presence."
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Through how many observations of co-occurrence, then, does inference occur? Who indeed can specify this? Through as many as it is seen, just through that many; it is not possible to state it by counting. Even those who say that the restriction is knowable by perception aided by repeated observation, and even those who, when the restriction is grasped even in a single observation, require repeated observation in order to dispel the suspicion of an adventitious condition—even they do not specify it in this manner; likewise we also [do not], so there is no difference from them. Now, should the fire's pervasion across all places and times of smoke not be understood by one who desires to infer? True, it need not be understood. Objection: If so, how can that which possesses a part of the subject, whose relation is unknown even generally, be designated by the word 'one whose relation is known' (jñātasambandha)? By this,
it is not the possessor of a part of the subject that is designated, but rather the possessor of a part of the example. This then is the meaning of the Bhāṣya: when the relation is known by means of the parts consisting of smoke and fire in another whole possessing parts, such as a kitchen, having seen that smoke, which is a part of it, elsewhere on a mountain or the like, or in that very same kitchen at another time, fire is inferred, because it is observed thus in ordinary life. And so, having said that the designation of a knower is by the word 'one whose relation is known', the meaning is not 'of a knower'. When the expectation arises: 'Of which knowable whole possessing parts?', it is said: 'of the possessor of a part of the example.' As they say:
"If someone has a connection known with a whole possessing parts through two parts,
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another similar to that, or that very one, is inferred distinctly through those two."
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"Or that very one through those two" intends another time. And speaking thus, he states that on the view where the referent of the compound is a whole possessing parts by the word 'one whose relation is known', the designation is of the possessor of a part of the example. Granted that it is so, that inference occurs just from the restriction of co-occurrence in the observed locations. But as for this apprehension arising from repeated observation that 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', how does that arise? For it does not fail to exist, nor is it an invalid means of knowledge, because it arises firmly for all people at all times. Therefore, it must be stated to which means of knowledge this belongs. It is replied: this apprehension is inferential, because it arises for one whose relation is known; and because its form is imperceptible, it is not sensory, owing to the absence of direct perception and owing to contradiction with experience. For to one who has perceived the co-occurrence of smoke with fire in many places and times, an inference occurs: 'All other [substrata] possessing smoke as well, past, future, and distant, possess fire, because of possessing smoke, like the observed kitchen and the like.' Therefore, by conforming to the totality of means of knowledge as in ordinary life, inference in another subject occurs just from the restriction of co-occurrence existing in another subject; thus it is unblemished. And he said:
"Therefore, in other subjects, whatever kind of pervadability of whichever [property] by whichever [pervader]
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was previously determined in however much space or time,
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of that [property] it would be of such kind in that much [space or time]; but in another observed subject,
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the pervaded portion indicates the pervader portion in that very manner."
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By the words "of whatever kind" and "of such a kind", it is shown that what is deficient in form compared to the form observed in an exemplar possesses neither the status of an inferential sign nor the status of what is signified by the sign. For ordinary people do not infer fire from a pigeon or the like merely through the property of having a whitish color, without the property of being smoke. Nor does an alteration of grass, which is invariably concomitant with hot fire, when observed in snow, cause one to infer a non-hot fire when heat is sublated because of a contradiction with the coldness apprehended by perception. And investigators must follow the operation of means of valid cognition in accordance with the ordinary world, not in contradiction to it. By this, the fallacious nature of all non-instigating reasons has been demonstrated. But a form other than that must be accepted without deficiency. Therefore, it is because of the property of being violence endowed with the property of being prohibited that concomitance with the property of being demerit is observed in the killing of a Brahmin and the like; and it is not observed as an inferential indicator of that [demerit] merely through the property of being violence without the property of being prohibited, since concomitance with the property of being demerit is observed in approaching the wife of a teacher and so forth [even without violence]. Just as concomitance of a student having the duty of study and the like with a preceptor is repeatedly understood, and so one does not infer an instructor merely from [a person being] a student; likewise, the concomitance of the sons of Devadatta with dark complexion is caused by the particular food, drink, and so forth consumed at the time of embryonic development, and therefore, in the absence of that, one does not infer the dark complexion of another son of his merely from the property of being Devadatta's son. By this, the inference that bodies, trees, plants, and the like have an agent possessing apprehension, like a pot and the like, on the grounds of being characterized by a structural arrangement, is refuted. To explain: it is only in the case of those things