Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.5

4.5

whose structural arrangements can be fashioned by a particular activity of the hands and the like, such as a pot, cloth, or house, that there is an agent possessing apprehension. In the absence of that, how can there be an inference of that in the case of transformational things like limbs and bodies merely by a particular structural arrangement, like the inference of fire from mere whiteness and the like? Likewise, concomitance of things characterized by a structural arrangement has been observed with an agent possessing intelligence who is endowed with a body, sense organs, and the like; and that [agent] is ruled out in grass sprouts and the like because of the non-perception of what is perceptible. When that is ruled out, a mere intelligent agent devoid of a body and the like cannot be inferred, like the inference of hot fire in snow from an alteration of grass or the like. Nor does this entail the consequence of destroying all inference; for, discarding all particularities, the universal of smoke-ness is understood to have concomitance with the universal of fire-ness, and on the mountain that is observed without any deficiency, so the inference of that there is legitimate. Only the universal is inferred, not a particular, because there is no recurrent continuity. Even though apprehended in the kitchen and the like, the universal, being recognized in another place and at another time by inference just as by perception, becomes the object of cognition, so there is no proving of what is already established. And the universal certainly possesses the relation of inherence in what is conjoined with the mountain, so its inference there is legitimate. Objection: Even due to a particular place, the nature of a thing becomes otherwise; for in some places death occurs even from a scorpion's sting, while in other places it does not; likewise, even in the case of smoke, there could be suspicion of deviation from fire in another place. True, this [suspicion] arises, but it can be dispelled by hearing from people who have arrived from those respective regions; thus everything is unblemished. Therefore, whatever universal or particular whose concomitance with whichever universal or particular in whatever manner is ascertained by whatever relation in the observed places and times, that very entity of that very kind, when observed in another place, another time, and so forth, makes known that [other entity] of such kind solely through the invariable rule of concomitance; and it is established that the invariable rule of concomitance can be understood in observed locations only through repeated observations assisted solely by the non-perception of deviation. The relation of the inferential sign with what is signified by the sign consists solely in an invariable rule, and that has repeated observation as its means of valid cognition.
By Pārthasārathi Miśra, following what was stated in the Vārttika,
the invariable rule together with its means of valid cognition has been determined in accordance with experience.