Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p12

4.2.p12

As for what was said—that restriction is the very nature of smoke—let this nature indeed be just identical with the non-deviation of the relation to fire. And what is this non-deviation other than the existence of relation to fire throughout all the space and time of smoke? And in that case, when that [nature] is perceived, the relation in other places and times would result in being perceived. Moreover, to say that one directly perceives an immediate form called 'restriction' belonging to smoke—distinct from its relation [to fire]—like paleness and the like, contradicts experience. Furthermore, if this were an additional form distinct from relation, like paleness and the like, then even when that is grasped by perception, the fire's pervading all places and times of smoke would not be grasped; for when one thing is grasped, another is not thereby grasped, because that would lead to over-extension. And if non-deviation across space and time is not grasped, how could inference arise? Moreover, this additional form as well, being grasped by perception, is grasped only as delimited by proximate space and time, so that a restriction with another time would not be established. As for what was also pointed out—that [it is] an enduring form, like that of a wall and the like—that too must be examined. Is the intention there that permanence itself is grasped, or that what is in fact enduring is grasped, or that it is the capacity for enduring? The first alternative does not hold: for permanence is persistence through multiple times; how could that be grasped by perception alone, since it has the present for its object? And if this were grasped by perception alone, then the regard for recognition in order to establish permanence would be useless. But in the second alternative, that is merely the form of the wall, nothing else; thus here too, it would only be established that what is in fact restricted is the very nature of smoke which is perceived. Nor is there any purpose served by that. As for capacity, since [the capacity] of all entities is cognised through postulation, its being cognisable through perception is impossible. In such cases, [the cognition] of permanence is inferential, because of prior acquaintance. And its inferential nature is clear because of the form stated [above]. For this cognition is of the following sort: 'If this is not split by a weapon or the like, then it will endure for some time.' Thus, even in the case of silver and the like, the permanence of its form is purely inferential. With this very intention it was said: