Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p8.2

4.2.p8.2

Nor is this fourfold contact possible between the mind and an external object, because [the mind] does not exist outside the body. Even for those who assert that the mind is all-pervading, although the mind is an all-pervading substance like space, they still maintain the status of an organ only for the mind as delimited by the body, just as [they do for] space delimited by the ear cavity; therefore, contact with an external object is impossible. Otherwise, inference and the like would also result in being perception, since their objects would be connected with the mind. If contact is only fourfold, how then is sound apprehended? For since sound and the auditory organ—which is identical to one among space, the directions, or the ego-sense—are inactive, contact between them is not possible, because [contact] is produced by action. To this it is replied: contact itself is their relation. And this is not produced by action, because [that definition] fails in the case of contact produced by contact. Nor is it produced by contact, because [that definition] fails in the case of [contact] produced by action. Continuous proximity residing in substance, which is common to both, is its cause. And that is possible even between two all-pervading entities. Or let it be that, because contact produced by contact is unproven, contact that has an origin is [always] produced by action, without exception; for the contact with the shuttle residing in the threads indeed resides also in the cloth once the threads have attained the state of cloth, but there is no cognition of another contact there. Then uncaused contact between two all-pervading entities will be established through inference: 'Two all-pervading entities are mutually in contact, because, while being substances, they are in continuous proximity, like a pot and space.' If, however, continuous proximity itself is contact, even so, contact is established for two all-pervading entities as well. But surely, [sound is not a substance] because there is no evidence for its residing in a substance? Surely an effect cannot exist without a substrate! True, but sound is not an effect, because it is eternal. But someone maintains that sound is a quality, like color and the like, because it is graspable by a single sense organ. For him too, there is inconclusiveness with regard to wind. Even if the qualification 'while being devoid of touch' is added, there is deviation with universals such as cowness and colorness, because these, although accessible to the eye alone, are not qualities.