Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.4.p13

4.4.p13

Through how many observations of coexistence, then, does an inference arise? Who indeed could state this? It arises through just as many as are observed, but it cannot be stated by counting. Even those who say that the invariable rule is grasped by perception assisted by repeated observation, and even those who, when the invariable rule is grasped even upon a single observation, require repeated observation in order to eliminate the suspicion of an extraneous condition—they too do not specify it in this way; likewise, neither do we; so there is no difference between them and us. 'Should, then, the fire's pervasion of all places and times of smoke not be understood by one who wishes to infer?' True, it need not be understood. 'Well, in that case, how is the possessor of one part of the subject, whose relation is not known even in general, designated by the phrase 'whose relation is known'?' This does not designate the possessor of one part of the subject; rather, it designates the possessor of one part of the example. This, then, is the meaning of the Bhāṣya: when the relation has been known between two parts—smoke and fire—in a different possessor of parts altogether, such as a kitchen, having seen that one part, smoke, elsewhere in a mountain or the like, or in that very kitchen at another time, fire is inferred, because it is observed thus in ordinary life. And so, having stated that by the word 'whose relation is known' there is a designation of the knower, the meaning is: not of the knower. When it is asked, 'of which object of valid cognition is it the possessor of parts?', it is said: 'of the example's possessor of parts.' As they said: 'If some possessor of parts has had its connection known through two parts,