Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.4.p15

4.4.p15

'Or that very one through those two' intends another time. And stating it thus, he says that under the view that the word 'whose relation is known' has the possessor of parts as the meaning of another word [in the compound], it designates the possessor of one part of the example. Be that as it may, inference arises just from the invariable rule of coexistence in observed places. But as for this apprehension arising from repeated observation that 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', how is that [explained]? For it does not fail to exist, nor is it unauthoritative, because it arises firmly for all people at all times. Therefore, this must be stated to be subsumed under some means of valid cognition. It is replied: this apprehension is inferential, because it arises for one whose relation is known. And because it has an imperceptible form, it is not sensory, owing to the absence of direct perception and because that would contradict experience. For once one has apprehended the coexistence of smoke with fire in many places and times, an inference occurs: 'All other places possessing smoke, whether past, future, or remote, possess fire, because they possess smoke, like the observed kitchen and the like.' Therefore, because it follows the totality of causal conditions for a means of valid cognition in accordance with ordinary experience, an inference regarding another property-bearer arises precisely from the invariable rule of coexistence residing in a different property-bearer; this is unexceptionable. And he says: 'Therefore, in whatever property-bearers, by whatever [probans], of whatever sort,