Mimamsashastrasarvasva 2.10

2.10

‘yavamayaścarurbhavati,’ ‘vārāhī upānahau,’ ‘vaitase kaṭe prājāpaśyān sañcinotī'ti śrūyate | tatra yavavarāhavetasaśabdāḥ kiṃ
priyaṅguvāyasajambūnāṃ vācakāḥ, kiṃ vā dīrghaśūkasūkaravañjulānāmiti śiṣṭānāmeva mitho'bhidhānavipratipatteḥ sandehaḥ
aviśeṣādubhayārthateti prāpte'bhidadhmahe-vākyaśeṣāddīrghaśūkādaya
eva vācyāḥ | 'yavamatībhiradbhirvauḍumbaryāḥ prokṣaṇe vidhīyamāne
vākyaśeṣo'yam 1 '
'yatrānyā auṣadhaglāneḥ sarvāṃsāmeva modanāt2'
evaṃ varāhavetasaśabdāvapi 'varāhaṃ gāvo'nudhāvanti,' 'apsujo
vetasa' iti vākyaśeṣānnirṇayete
ācāryāstu3" naivocyante kvaciddeśe yavaśrutyā priyaṅgavaḥ
jambū na vetasaṃ prāhurvarāhaṃ nāpi vāyasam4
adhyāropya vicāreṇa kiṃ mudhā khidyate manaḥ
sandigdheṣu ca sarveṣu vākyaśeṣeṇa nirṇayam5
vakṣyatyeva na tenāpi pṛthakkāryā vicāraṇā
tasmādanyadudāhṛtya vicāryamidamīdṛśam6
yatra vipratipattiḥ syādāryamlecchaprasiddhijā7
tatra kiṃ tulyatā yuktā kimekaiva balīyasī8"
yadā yatra mātuladuhitṛpariṇayanādiṣu smṛtyācārayorvirodhastatra
kiṃ tulyakakṣatvamuta smṛtīnāṃ balīyastvamiti saṃśayaḥ
tatra–
" yathaiva śrutimūlatvāt smaraṇānāṃ pramāṇatā
ācārāṇāṃ tathaiveti na viśeṣo balābale1 "
evaṃ prāpte brūmaḥ–
"sapratyayapraṇītā hi smṛtiḥ sopanibandhanā
tayā śrutyanumānaṃ hi nirvighnamupalabhyate2
ācārāttu smṛtiṃ jñātvā śrutirvijñāyate tataḥ
tena dvayantaritaṃ tasya prāmāṇyaṃ viprakṛṣyate3 "
'pratyayitatarā hi manvādayaḥ smarttāraḥ | tatsmaraṇaṃ guṇavattarakarttṛkatvenetarajanacāritrādvisrambhaṇīyataram
kiñca ācaritṛṇāṃ janānāṃ svayamitastato viprakīrṇaparaprakaraṇādigataśrutyuddharaṇenārthaṃ pratipattuṃ sāmarthyābhāvādavaśyamete maharṣibhireva jñātvā smṛtvā samarpitamarthamanutiṣṭhantītyaṅgīkāryyam | ataścācārasya smṛtikalpanena śrutikalpakatvamiti dvayantaritaṃ prāmāṇyam
api ca karmasvarūpamātramācāreṣu pratyakṣam, karttavyatā tu
sukhādihetvantaramālocya pariśeṣāt kalpyā | paścānmūlabhūtaśrutikalpanam | smṛtiṣu tu drāgeva granthataḥ karttavyatāvagatau satyāṃ mūlamātraṃ
kalpyamiti mahānaviśeṣaḥ | na cātra vikalpaḥ | vastuni tadasambhavāt | na hi mātuladuhitṛpariṇayana pratyavāyaṃ janayati ceti
sabhavati | tasmāt gṛhyamāṇakādihetvantarasyācārasyaivāprāmāṇyam
atha vā 1 ”
padārthapadasambandhe tulyatvaṃ lokavedayoḥ
adṛṣṭasādhanatve hi lokādvedo'tiricyate 2 ”
tasmādvikalpenārthadvayaṃ grāhyamiti pūrvaḥ pakṣa'
“ siddhāntastuvākyaikatvaṃ vidhisrutayorviṣayaikyādṛte na hi
tenātra vākyaśeṣasthā pratipattirbalīyasī
tasmācca vākyaśeṣaḥ citradvahiṣpavamānamityādiṣu tatra tāvattadanuguṇa evārthaḥ samāśrayaṇīya iti tāvadiha sthitam | yatra tu
vākyaśeṣo nāsti citradagniśrudagniṣṭoma ityādiṣu tatrāpi rūr̤hivaśādayamevārtha iti daśame vakṣyate | caruśabdo'pi sthātyāṃ
lākṣaṇikaḥ | tenāsatyapi vākyaśeṣe ‘sauryaṃ caru’mityādāvodanavacanatvameveti daśame vakṣyate | na ca ‘sandigdheṣu vākyaśeṣā’dityanena gatārthatvam | iha vākyaśeṣātprāgarthāntaraṃ nirṇītaṃ vākyaśeṣeṇa
bādhyate na tu prathamaṃ sandigdhaṃ tena nirṇīyata iti 1”
6 mlecchaprasiddhārthaprāmāṇyādhikaraṇam
coditaṃ tu pratīyetāvirodhāt pramāṇena

It is heard [in scripture]: ‘A cooked dish of barley (yavamaya caru) is [offered],’ ‘Boar-leather (vārāhī) shoes,’ ‘On a reed (vaitasa) mat he collects the victims sacred to Prajāpati.’ There, because of mutual disagreement in expression among the cultured people themselves as to whether the words ‘yava’, ‘varāha’, and ‘vetasa’ denote panic seeds (priyaṅgu), crows, and black plums (jambū), or long-bearded grains [barley], boars, and reeds (vañjula), a doubt arises. When it is proposed: ‘Since there is no distinction, both meanings apply,’ we state: By the rest of the sentence, only the long-bearded grain and so forth are the denoted senses. When sprinkling the post of udumbara wood with water containing barley is enjoined, this is the rest of the sentence:
‘Where other plants languish, rejoicing over all of them…’
So too, the words ‘varāha’ and ‘vetasa’ are determined from the rest of the sentence: ‘The cows run after the boar,’ and ‘The reed is born in water.’

But the teachers [say]:
“Nowhere in any region are panic seeds designated by the word ‘yava’;
nor do they call a black plum a ‘vetasa’, nor a crow a ‘varāha’.
Why weary the mind in vain with an imagined enquiry?
And regarding all doubtful cases, that determination is made by the rest of the sentence
he will indeed state; no separate enquiry should be made by that [principle] either.
Therefore, citing another [example], a topic such as this should be enquired into:
where there is disagreement arising from the usage of the Āryas and the Mlecchas,
is equality appropriate there, or is one alone stronger?”

When there is a conflict between smṛti and customary practice, as in the marriage of a maternal uncle's daughter, the doubt is: Is there equal status, or are the smṛtis stronger? There:
“Just as the smṛtis have authority because of being rooted in śruti,
so it is with customary practices; thus there is no difference in relative strength.”
This being proposed, we say:
“Smṛti is composed by trustworthy persons and is recorded in a text;
through it, the inference of a śruti is obtained without obstacle.
From customary practice, however, smṛti is known, and thence śruti is understood;
therefore, its authority is delayed, being intervened by two [steps].”
For Manu and other smṛti-authors are more trustworthy. Their recollection, having superior authors, is more worthy of trust than the conduct of ordinary people.
Furthermore, because the people performing the practices lack the capacity to ascertain the meaning by extracting śruti passages scattered here and there in other contexts, it must be accepted that these [people] perform only that duty which has been determined, remembered, and handed down by the great seers. And therefore, since customary practice leads to the assumption of śruti by way of assuming a smṛti, its authority is intervened by two steps.
Moreover, only the mere form of the action is perceived in customary practices, whereas obligatoriness must be assumed by elimination after considering another cause such as pleasure. Afterward comes the assumption of a foundational śruti. In the smṛtis, however, when obligatoriness is known immediately from the text, only the root needs to be assumed; thus there is a great difference. And there is no option here, for that is impossible in an objective fact: it is impossible that marrying a maternal uncle's daughter both incurs sin and does not. Therefore, customary practice, whose other causes such as passion are perceived, is simply without authority.
Or rather:
“The connection of word and object is equal in the everyday world and the Veda;
for the Veda excels the world only in being a means to unseen results.”
Therefore, the prima facie view is that both meanings are to be accepted optionally.

“The established conclusion, however, is: A single sentence cannot exist without unity of the subject matter of the two heard injunctions;
therefore, the understanding based on the rest of the sentence is stronger here.”
And therefore the rest of the sentence: In such cases as ‘The varied [rite] is the bahiṣpavamāna’, only the meaning conforming to it is to be adopted; this much is settled here. Where, however, there is no rest of the sentence, as in ‘The varied [rite] is the agniṣṭut’, ‘The agniṣṭoma’, and so forth, it will be explained in the Tenth [Chapter] that even there, by force of conventional usage, this very meaning [applies]. The word ‘caru’ is also figurative for an earthen pot; therefore, even when there is no rest of the sentence, in ‘a cooked dish for Sūrya’ and so on, it designates cooked rice alone, as will be explained in the Tenth [Chapter]. Nor is this redundant with ‘In doubtful cases, from the rest of the sentence.’ Here, another meaning determined prior to the rest of the sentence is sublated by the rest of the sentence; it is not that a case doubtful from the outset is determined by it. (1)

6. Topic on the authority of meanings well-known to Mlecchas.
‘What is enjoined, however, should be understood through an instrument of knowledge, because of non-conflict.’