Mimamsasutra 115.2

115.2

atha gaur ityevamādayaḥ śabdāḥ kim ākṛteḥ pramāṇam uta vyakter iti saṃdehaḥ. ucyate. idaṃ tāvat parīkṣyatām - kiṃ ya eva laukikāḥ śabdāḥ, ta eva vaidikā utānya iti. yadā ta eva, tadāpi kiṃ ta evaiṣām arthāḥ, ye loke, utānya iti saṃśayaḥ. tatrānye laukikāḥ śabdāḥ, anye vaidikā anye caiṣām arthā iti brūmaḥ. kutaḥ. vyapadeśabhedād rūpabhedāc ca. ime laukikāḥ, ime vaidikā iti vyapadeśabhedaḥ. agnir vṛtrāṇi jaṅghanad ity anyad idaṃ rūpaṃ laukikād agniśabdāt. śabdānyatvāc ca na ta evārthāḥ. api ca samāmananti - uttānā vai devagavā vahantīti. ye devānāṃ gāvaḥ, ta uttānā vahantīty ukte gamyata eva - ya uttānā vahanti, te gośabdenocyanta [79]iti. tasmād anyo vaidikagośabdasyārthaḥ. tathā - devebhyo vanaspate havīṃṣi hiraṇyaparṇa pradivaste artham iti, hiraṇyaparṇo vai devo vanaspatir vede. etad vai daivyaṃ madhu, yad ghṛtam iti veda ghṛte madhuśabdaḥ. tasmād amīṣām anye 'rthā iti prāpte brūmaḥ - ya eva laukikāḥ śabdāḥ, ta eva vaidikāḥ, ta evaiṣām arthā iti. kutaḥ. prayogacodanābhāvāt. evaṃ prayogacodanā saṃbhavati, yadi ta eva śabdāḥ, ta evārthāḥ. itarathā śabdānyatve 'rtho na pratīyeta. tasmād ekaśabdatvam iti. ucyate prayojanam idam, hetur vyapadiśyatām iti. tato hetur ucyate - avibhāgād iti. na teṣām eṣāṃ ca vibhāgam upalabhāmahe. ata evaikaśabdatvam. tāṃś ca tāṃś cārthān avagacchāmaḥ. ato nānyatvaṃ ca vadāmaḥ. yac coktam - ya uttānā vadanti, te devagāvāḥ; yad ghṛtam, tan madhu; yo hiraṇya-parṇaḥ, sa vanaspatir iti. nāsti vacanaṃ yad uttānānāṃ vahatāṃ gotvaṃ brūyāt. ye gāvaḥ, ta uttānā vahantīty evaṃ tat. yadi cānena vacanena gotvaṃ vidhīyate, uttānā vahantīty anuvādaḥ syāt. na cottānā vahantaḥ prasiddhāḥ kecit. te niyogato vidhātavyāḥ, teṣu vidhīyamāneṣu na śakyaṃ gotvaṃ vidhātum. bhidyate hi tathā vākyam. yadi cānye vaidikāḥ, tata uttānādīnām artho na gamyeta. tatra natarāṃ śakyetāvijñātalakṣaṇaṃ gotvaṃ vijñātum. na cottānavahanavacanam apy anarthakam, stutyarthenārthavad bhaviṣyatīti. evaṃ ghṛtasya madhutvam, hiraṇyaparṇatā ca vanaspateḥ. tasmāt ta eva śabdā arthāś ca.
yadi laukikās ta evārthāḥ, tadā saṃdehaḥ - kim ākṛtiḥ śabdārtho 'tha vyaktir iti. kā punar ākṛtiḥ, kā vyaktir iti. dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ, asādhāraṇaviśeṣā [80] vyaktiḥ. kutaḥ saṃśayaḥ? gaur ity ukte sāmānyapratyayād, vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbandhāt.
tad ucyate - vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti. kutaḥ? prayogacodanābhāvāt. ālambhanaprokṣaṇaviśasanādīnāṃ prayogacodanā ākṛtyarthe na saṃbhaveyuḥ. yatroccāraṇānarthakyam, tatra vyaktyarthaḥ. ato 'nyatrākṛtivacana iti cet. uktam - anyāyaś cānekārthatvam iti. kathaṃ sāmānyāvagatir iti cet. vyaktipadārthasyākṛtiś cihnabhūtā bhaviṣyati, ya evam ākṛtikaḥ, sa gaur iti. yathā yasya daṇḍo 'sti, sa daṇḍīti, na ca daṇḍavacano daṇḍiśabdaḥ. evam ihāpi.

Now, there is a doubt: are words such as 'cow' an authority for [meaning] the universal form or the individual? It is answered: Let this first be examined—are Vedic words the very same as ordinary worldly words, or are they different? Even when they are the very same, do they have the very same meanings as in ordinary life, or different ones? This is the doubt. On this, we say: ordinary worldly words are one thing, Vedic words are another, and their meanings are also different. Why? Because of a distinction in designation and a distinction in form. 'These are worldly, these are Vedic'—this is the distinction in designation. 'May Agni repeatedly slay the Vṛtras'—this is a form different from the ordinary worldly word 'agni'. And because the words are different, their meanings are not the very same. Moreover, they recite: 'Supine indeed do the divine cattle draw [the cart].' When it is said, 'Those which are the cattle of the gods draw lying on their backs', it is certainly understood that those which draw lying on their backs are designated by the word 'cow'. Therefore, the meaning of the Vedic word 'cow' is different. Likewise: 'O tree, [carry] the oblations to the gods, O golden-leaved one, for your purpose from of old'—in the Veda, the divine tree is indeed golden-leaved. In 'This indeed is divine honey, which is ghee', the word 'honey' is used for ghee in the Veda. Therefore, when it is prima facie maintained that these have different meanings, we reply: Vedic words are the very same as ordinary worldly words, and their meanings are the very same. Why? Because otherwise there would be no injunction of performance. An injunction of performance is possible in this way: if the words are the very same, their meanings are the very same. Otherwise, if the words were different, the meaning would not be understood. Therefore, there is identity of words. [The opponent] says: This is the purpose; let the reason be stated. Then the reason is stated: 'because of non-division [or non-difference].' We do not perceive any division between those [Vedic words] and these [worldly words]. Precisely because of this, there is identity of words. And we understand those very same meanings. Therefore, we do not affirm any difference. And as for what was said—that those which draw lying on their backs are the divine cattle; that what is ghee is honey; that what is golden-leaved is the tree: there is no statement that would declare being-a-cow of those that draw lying on their backs. It is rather this: 'those which are cows draw lying on their backs.' And if being-a-cow were enjoined by this statement, 'draw lying on their backs' would be a reiteration. Nor are any [creatures] known to draw lying on their backs. They would have to be enjoined necessarily; and while they are being enjoined, it is impossible to enjoin being-a-cow. For then the sentence would be split. Moreover, if Vedic words were different, then the meaning of 'lying on the back' and so on would not be understood; under those circumstances, it would be all the more impossible to understand being-a-cow whose definition is unknown. Nor is the statement about drawing lying on the back useless; it will be meaningful as a praise. In the same way [are explained] ghee's being honey and the tree's being golden-leaved. Therefore, the words and the meanings are the very same.
If the meanings are the very same as the ordinary worldly ones, then there is a doubt: is the word's meaning the universal form or the individual? But what is the universal form, and what is the individual? The common factor of substances, qualities, and actions is the universal form; the particular, unshared distinctions are the individual. Whence is the doubt? Because when 'cow' is uttered, there is a cognition of the universal, and yet the connection with action is in the individual.
To this it is said [prima facie]: The individual is the meaning of the word. Why? Because otherwise there would be no injunction of performance. Injunctions of performance for seizing, sprinkling, slaughtering, and so forth could not be possible with respect to the universal form. If it is said: Where utterance [for the universal] would be purposeless, there the meaning is the individual; elsewhere it designates the universal form—[we reply:] It has already been stated: 'And attributing multiple meanings is improper.' If it is asked: How then is there cognition of the common universal? [we answer:] The universal form will serve as an indicator of the individual referent: 'one which possesses such a form is a cow.' Just as one who has a staff is a 'staff-bearer', and yet the word 'staff-bearer' does not denote a staff; so it is here too.