Nyayasutra 381.3

381.3

samupākhyāyamānaṃ kathaṃ nirupākhyam abhāvaḥ syād iti? na jātv abhāvo nirupākhyo 'nekatayāśeṣatayā śakyaḥ pratijñātum iti/ sarvam etad abhāva iti cet --- yad idaṃ sarvam iti manyase tadabhāva iti? evaṃ cet anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ, anekam aśeṣaṃ ceti nābhāve pratyayena śakyaṃ bhavitum/ asti cāyaṃ pratyayaḥ sarvam iti, tasmān nābhāva iti/
pratijñāhetvoś ca vyāghātaḥ --- sarvam abhāva iti bhāvapratiṣedhaḥ pratijñā, bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddher iti hetuḥ/ bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvam anujñāyāśritya ca itaretarābhāvasiddhyā sarvam abhāva ity ucyate/ yadi sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddher iti nopapadyate/ atha bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddhiḥ, sarvam abhāva iti nopapadyate/

how could what is designated by a name be non-existence, which is nameless? For never can nameless non-existence be asserted as manifold and exhaustive. If [you say], “All this is non-existence” — that what you think to be ‘all this’ is non-existent? If that is the case, the contradiction is not removed: there cannot be a cognition with the content ‘manifold’ and ‘exhaustive’ in regard to non-existence. And this cognition ‘all’ does exist; therefore, it is not non-existence.
Moreover, there is a contradiction between proposition and logical reason: the proposition is ‘all is non-existence’, which is a denial of existence; the logical reason is ‘because of the establishment of mutual non-existence among existent things’. Having conceded and relied upon mutual non-existence among existent things, it is said that all is non-existence through the establishment of mutual non-existence. If all is non-existence, then [the reason] ‘because of the establishment of mutual non-existence among existent things’ is not tenable. And if mutual non-existence among existent things is established, then [the proposition] ‘all is non-existence’ is not tenable.