Nyayasutra 381.7

381.7

so 'yam abhāvasya nirupākhyatvāt sampratyāyako 'rthabhedo na syāt? asti tv ayam, tasmān na sarvam abhāva iti/
atha vā na svabhāvasiddher bhāvānām iti svarūpasiddher iti/ gaur iti prayujyamāne śabde jātiviśiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ gṛhyate, nābhāvamātram/ yadi ca sarvam abhāvaḥ gaur ity abhāvaḥ pratīyeta, gośabdena cābhāva ucyeta/ yasmāt tu gośabdaprayoge dravyaviśeṣaḥ pratīyate nābhāvas tasmād ayuktam iti/
atha vā na svabhāvasiddher iti/ asan gaur aśvātmaneti gavātmanā kasmān nocyate? avacanād gavātmanā gaur astīti svabhāvasiddhiḥ, anaśvo 'śva iti vā gaur agaur iti vā kasmān nocyate? avacanāt svena rūpeṇa vidyamānatā dravyasyeti vijñāyate/

Since non-existence is nameless, would not this distinction of objects that produces communication be absent? But it does exist; therefore, all is not non-existence.
Alternatively: ‘[All is] not [non-existence], because of the establishment of the intrinsic nature of existent things’ means: because of the establishment of their essential form. When the word ‘cow’ is uttered, a substance qualified by the universal is apprehended, not mere non-existence. And if all were non-existence, non-existence would be understood from [the word] ‘cow’, and non-existence would be expressed by the word ‘cow’. But since, upon the utterance of the word ‘cow’, a particular substance is understood, not non-existence, therefore [the view] is incorrect.
Alternatively: ‘because of the establishment of intrinsic nature’ [means]: why is it not said, ‘a cow is non-existent as a cow’, as [it is said], ‘a cow is non-existent as a horse’? From the absence of such a statement, [it follows that] a cow exists as a cow; thus there is the establishment of intrinsic nature. Or why is it not said, ‘a horse is a non-horse’, or ‘a cow is a non-cow’? From the absence of such a statement, it is understood that the substance exists in its own form.