Nyāya Sūtras 248
Nyāyabhāṣya 248
- Language
- Sanskrit
248.2
dṛṣṭānumitānāṃ hi niyogapratiṣedhānupapattiḥ ||
For command or prohibition cannot apply to things that are observed and inferred.
248.3
pramāṇasya tattvaviṣayatvāt/ na khalu bhoḥ parīkṣamāṇena dṛṣṭānumitā arthāḥ śakyā niyoktum evaṃ bhavateti,
Because a means of valid cognition has reality as its domain. For surely, sir, things observed and inferred cannot be commanded by an investigator: ‘Be thus!’
248.4
nāpi pratiṣeddhum evaṃ na bhavateti/ na hīdam upapadyate rūpavad gandho 'pi cākṣuṣo bhavatv iti, gandhavad vā rūpaṃ cākṣuṣaṃ mā bhūd iti, agnipratipattivat dhūmenodakapratipattir api bhavatv iti, udakāpratipattivad vā dhūmenāgnipratipattir api mā bhūd iti/ kiṃ kāraṇam? yathā khalv arthā bhavanti ya eṣāṃ svo bhāvaḥ svo dharma iti tathābhūtāḥ pramāṇena pratipadyanta iti/ tathābhūtaviṣayakaṃ hi pramāṇam iti/ imau khalu niyogapratiṣedhau bhavatā deśitau kācābhrapaṭalādivad vā kuḍyādibhir apratighāto bhavatu kuḍyādivad vā kācābhrapaṭalādibhir apratighāto mā bhūd iti/ na, dṛṣṭānumitāḥ khalv ime dravyadharmāḥ, pratighātāpratighātayor hy upalabdhī vyavasthāpike/ vyavahitānupalabdhyānumīyate kuḍyādibhiḥ pratighātaḥ, vyavahitopalabdhyānumīyate kācābhrapaṭalādibhir apratighāta iti//51//
nor can it be prohibited with: 'Do not be like this!' For it does not make sense to say: 'Let smell too be visible like color', or 'Like smell, let color not be visible', or 'Like the understanding of fire from smoke, let there also be the understanding of water', or 'Like the non-understanding of water, let there be no understanding of fire from smoke either.' What is the reason? Objects are indeed understood by a means of valid cognition as they actually are, according to what their own nature and their own properties are. For a means of valid cognition has as its sphere things as they are. These two injunctions and prohibitions were indeed indicated by you: 'Let there be non-obstruction by walls and the like, as by glass, mica sheets, and the like', or 'Let there not be non-obstruction by glass, mica sheets, and the like, as by walls and the like.' No: these properties of substances are known through perception and inference. For it is perceptions that establish obstruction and non-obstruction: obstruction by walls and the like is inferred by the non-apprehension of screened [objects], and non-obstruction by glass, mica sheets, and the like is inferred by the apprehension of screened [objects].
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Nyāyavārttika — Uddyotakara, Sanskrit
- Nyāyālaṃkāra — Abhayatilaka, Sanskrit
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit