Nyāya Sūtras 264

Not so, because earthy and watery [substances] are perceptible.

'Not so' rejects the triad of aphorisms. Why? Because earthy substance and watery substance are perceptible. Since apprehension is due to magnitude, having multiple component substances, and color, only fiery substance would be perceptible, not earthy or watery substance, due to the absence of color. But because earthy and watery substances are perceptible just like the fiery, the grasping of multiple qualities in the elements is not due to mixture. And for one who asserts that the perceptibility of earthy and watery substances is caused by the color of another element, it would follow that wind is perceptible; or let a reason for the restriction be stated.

Or, because the two tastes, earthy and aqueous, are perceived: earthy taste is sixfold, aqueous [taste] is only sweet; and this cannot occur from intermixture. Or, because the two colors, earthy and aqueous, are perceived when assisted by fiery color, for in an intermixture there would only be a manifestor color and no color to be manifested. And because the colors of earth and water are perceived as being single and multiple respectively: earthy color is manifold—green, red, yellow, and so forth—whereas aqueous [color] is white and non-illuminating, and this is not possible if there were an intermixture of things possessing only one quality. And this is merely an example; the elaboration goes beyond this. Or, because the two touches, earthy and fiery, are perceived: earthy touch is neither hot nor cold, [and] fiery [touch] is perceived as hot, and this is not possible through intermixture of things having only one quality with wind, whose touch is neither hot nor cold. Or rather, because earthy and aqueous substances are perceived with fixed qualities: the earthy substance having four qualities and the aqueous substance having three qualities are perceived; by that, their cause is inferred to be of the same nature. For the effect is a mark [of the cause], since the existence of the effect comes from the existence of the cause. Likewise, because the fiery and airy substances are perceived to have a fixed distribution of qualities, there is an inference of a fixed distribution in their causes. And a distinction is observed, because earthy and aqueous [substances] are perceived [independently]: an earthy substance is grasped by perception separated from water and the rest;

and an aqueous [substance is grasped] without the following two, and a fiery [substance] without wind, and [yet] they are not grasped as having only one quality each. Moreover, the statement that "for the subsequent is pervaded by the preceding" is devoid of inference, because no inferential mark is grasped here by which we might accept this in that way. And what was said—that "for the subsequent is pervaded by the preceding" is to be understood in the creation of the elements, not at present—is incorrect, because there is no reason for such a restriction. And at present it is observed that a subsequent [element] is pervaded by a preceding one, as fire is pervaded by wind. Being pervaded is conjunction, and that is equal to both; and there is no reason for a restriction that fire possesses touch because it is pervaded by wind, but wind does not possess color because it is pervaded by fire. And it is observed that airy touch is not grasped due to being overpowered by fiery touch, and one thing is not overpowered by that very same thing.