Nyāya Sūtras 302

302.2

etac ca ---

302.3

vyāsaktamanasaḥ pādavyathanena saṃyogaviśeṣeṇa samānam ||

Is the same as the particular contact [brought about] by pain in the foot when one's mind is distracted.

302.4

yadā khalv ayaṃ vyāsaktamanāḥ kvacid deśe śarkarayā kaṇṭakena vā pādavyathanam āpnoti tadā ātmamanaḥ saṃyogaviśeṣa eṣitavyaḥ, dṛṣṭaṃ hi duḥkhaṃ duḥkhavedanaṃ ceti/ tatrāyaṃ samānaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ/ yadṛcchayā tu na viśeṣo nākasmikī kriyā nākasmikaḥ saṃyoga iti/
karmādṛṣṭam upabhogārthaṃ kriyāhetur iti cet samānam/ karmādṛṣṭaṃ puruṣasthaṃ puruṣopabhogārthaṃ manasi kriyāhetuḥ evaṃ duḥkhaṃ duḥkhasaṃvedanaṃ ca sidhyatīty evaṃ cen manyase, samānam --- smṛtihetāv api saṃyogaviśeṣo bhavitum arhati/ tatra yad uktam ``ātmapreraṇayadṛcchājñatābhiś ca na saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ'' ity ayam apratiṣedha iti/ pūrvas tu pratiṣedho ``nāntaḥśarīravṛttitvān manasa'' iti//32//

When someone whose mind is distracted incurs pain in the foot due to a gravel stone or a thorn in a certain place, a particular contact between the self and the mind must be admitted, for pain and the sensation of pain are observed. In that case, this objection is the same: for there is no particularity through chance, no motion without cause, and no contact without cause. If you say that unseen karmic merit or demerit, whose purpose is experience, is the cause of motion, it is the same: if you think that unseen karmic merit or demerit residing in the person, whose purpose is the person's experience, is the cause of motion in the mind, and thus pain and the sensation of pain are established, it is the same—a particular contact could also occur with respect to the cause of memory. Therefore, as for what was said: "Nor is there a particular contact through the self's impelling, through chance, or through the consciousness [of the mind]," this is not a valid refutation. The previous refutation, however, [remains valid]: "No, because the mind operates inside the body."