Nyāya Sūtras 307

[Sūtra 3.2.37]: But restriction and non-restriction distinguish them.

Restriction and non-restriction distinguish—differentiate—those two, desire and aversion: activity and cessation are caused by desire and aversion in a knower, not in their own substratum.

[Activity and cessation do not abide in their own locus;] rather, where? In the locus of what is directed. There, activity and cessation belong to the elements that are directed, not to all of them; thus the non-restriction is established. But for one according to whom initiation and cessation abide in their own locus because the elements are cognizers and [their initiation and cessation] are caused by desire and aversion, there would be a restriction. Just as the activity of the elements caused by another quality, and their cessation due to the hindrance of a quality, occurs without exception in all elements alike, so activity and cessation caused by knowledge, desire, and aversion would abide without exception in all elements alike in their own locus; but they do not. Therefore, knowledge, desire, aversion, and volition reside in the director, whereas activity and cessation abide in the directed—this is established.

In a single body, however, a plurality of knowers lacks an inference. For the advocate of the consciousness of the elements, there would be many elements in a single body possessing the qualities of knowledge, desire, aversion, and effort, so that a plurality of knowers would follow. For one who says 'yes', there is no means of valid cognition. Just as in different bodies there are different knowers because of the distribution of qualities such as cognition, so even in a single body there should be an inference of the distribution of cognition and the like to establish a plurality of knowers [which is not found].

And a particular activity of elements caused by the quality of another is observed, and that is an inference elsewhere too. A particular activity caused by the quality of another is observed in elements that have the character of instruments, such as an axe, and in those that have the character of material causes, such as clay. That is an inference elsewhere too, in moving and stationary bodies: a particular activity of the elements, having as its inferential mark the arrangement of their parts, is caused by the quality of another. And that quality, which has a common substratum with effort, is a trace termed merit and demerit, which serves every purpose and is the instigator of the elements for the attainment of human ends, like effort.
The denial of the consciousness of the elements should be understood as established by the reasons for the existence of the self and the reasons for the eternality of the self. And the denial is the same according to [the sūtra]: 'Nor in the sense organ and the object, because knowledge remains even when they are destroyed.' Thinking that mere motion and mere cessation of motion are exertion and cessation, it was said: 'Because [exertion and cessation] are their marks, there is no denial [of desire and aversion] in earthy and other [elements].' But exertion and cessation have been explained otherwise, and such [forms of them] are not observed in earth and the like. Therefore, it is incorrect to say: 'Because [exertion and cessation] are their marks, there is no denial [of desire and aversion] in earthy and other [elements].'