Nyayasutra 309

Now this is the summary of what has been established:

[Sūtra 3.2.39]: By elimination, and because of the validity of the reasons stated above, [the self is conscious].

The subject under discussion is: knowledge is a property of the self. Elimination means 'the definite conviction regarding the remainder when, once [other alternatives] are brought up and eliminated, they cannot apply elsewhere.' When elements, sense organs, and mind are eliminated, no other substance can apply, and the self remains; thus it is known that knowledge is its property. And [the sūtra states:] 'and because of the cogency of the aforementioned logical reasons,' because the logical reasons for the apprehension of the self—such as 'because of the grasping of one and the same object through seeing and touching'—have not been refuted. The statement 'because of the cogency of the aforementioned logical reasons' is made to indicate elimination and to indicate the proof, etc., of what is under discussion. Alternatively, 'and because of cogency' is indeed an additional logical reason. This self is certainly eternal, because having performed virtue in one body, upon the destruction of the body, it is reborn in heaven among the gods; having performed vice, upon the destruction of the body, it is reborn in the hells. Rebirth is defined as the attainment of another body. That has a locus when a being exists and is eternal; but in a mere stream of cognitions devoid of a self, having no locus, it is not possible. And transmigration is possible as the association of a single being with multiple bodies, and final release, liberation, is possible as the termination of the continuous series of bodies. But in a mere continuous series of cognitions, because a single being is impossible, no one would run along the long path, and no one would be released from the continuous series of bodies; hence transmigration and final release would be impossible. And in a mere continuous series of cognitions, because beings would be different, this entire mass of worldly practices of living beings would be unconnected, unseparated, and unsettled,

and consequently, due to the absence of memory, one would not remember what was seen by another. Memory, indeed, is the grasping of what was previously known by the very same cognizer, in the form: 'I have known this knowable object.' This single cognizer grasps an object previously known, and this grasping of his is memory; that is impossible in a mere stream of cognitions devoid of a self. ||39