Nyāya Sūtras 314

[Answer:] By the citation of the logical reason, that which was to be refuted is conceded.

That cognition perishes immediately upon arising is what was to be refuted; that very thing is conceded [by the opponent] when he says: ‘like the indistinct apprehension of colour in a flash of lightning’.

[The opponent says:] 'Where there is indistinct apprehension, there cognition is destroyed as soon as produced.' [We reply:] The variation in apprehension is due to variation in the causes of apprehension, not to variation in cognition. That this apprehension is indistinct in some cases and distinct in others—this variation is due to variation in the cause of apprehension. Where the cause of apprehension is unstable, there apprehension is indistinct; where it is stable, there it is distinct; it is not due to the stability or instability of cognition. Why? For cognition is apprehension of an object; whatever apprehension of an object there is—whether indistinct or distinct—that is cognition. And indistinct apprehension is merely the apprehension of the universal property when specific qualities are not apprehended; in that case, another cognition does not arise regarding another object, because of the absence of an operative cause. Where a possessor of properties is apprehended endowed with common properties and endowed with specific properties, that is distinct apprehension; but where, specific properties not being apprehended, there is merely apprehension of the common property, that is indistinct apprehension. And the connection with specific properties is a different object from the connection with common properties; that apprehension does not occur with regard to it is because of the absence of the cause of apprehension, not because of the instability of cognition.

Furthermore, apprehension is distinct according to its object, and because cognitions are restricted to their respective objects. Apprehension whose object is a common property is distinct with respect to its own object, and apprehension whose object is a specific property is distinct with respect to its own object, for cognitions are restricted to their respective objects. So this indistinct apprehension that has been pointed out—with regard to what object could it be caused by the instability of cognition?
However, this [distinction between distinct and indistinct] is explained by the presence and absence of a multiplicity of cognitions with respect to the difference of properties in the possessor of properties. The object that is the possessor of properties indeed has both common properties and specific properties; regarding them, there are multiple cognitions restricted to their respective objects. If both of these reside in the possessor of properties, then apprehension is distinct with reference to the possessor of properties. But when there is merely apprehension of the common property, then apprehension is indistinct. Thus, with reference to the possessor of properties, distinct and indistinct apprehensions are explained.