Nyāya Sūtras 342

No, because there would follow the experience of what was not done.

This example does not hold. Why? Because there would follow the experience of what was not done. ‘Not done’ means not established by a means of valid cognition; its ‘experience’ is acceptance, an assumption. One who places faith in this would have to accept what is not established by a means of valid cognition. Therefore this is not an example: neither perception nor inference is stated in any way. This expresses the example's being unproved like the probandum.
Alternatively: ‘No, because there would follow the experience of what was not done.’ For one who resolves that the arising of the body is not caused by karma by using the example of the blackness of an atom, there would follow the experience of what was not done. It would follow that pleasure and pain come to a person when no karma that is the cause of pleasure and pain has been done. If one says ‘yes’, that contradicts perception, inference, and testimony.

First, the contradiction with perception: This pleasure and pain is differentiated, being perceptible to all embodied beings because it is felt individually by each self. What is the difference? It is intense, dull, lasting, fleeting, manifold, or of a single kind—such are the distinctions. Nor is there [in your view] a specific cause of pleasure and pain fixed to each individual self; and in the absence of a specific cause, a specific effect is never observed. But when the connection with pleasure and pain is caused by karma, the differentiation of pleasure and pain is tenable because karmas are admitted to be intense or dull, because accumulations of karma possess superiority and inferiority, and because karmas are manifold or of a single kind. This observed differentiation of pleasure and pain would not exist because of the absence of differentiation in the cause; thus there is a contradiction with perception.
Likewise, the contradiction with inference: For the determination of pleasure and pain is observed to result from the determination of qualities in a person. A conscious being who, understanding that pleasure is to be produced by a means and desiring it, makes an effort to obtain the means, is joined with pleasure, not the reverse. And one who, understanding that pain is to be produced by a means and desiring to avoid it, strives to avoid the means, is freed from pain, not the reverse. And there is this determination of pleasure and pain among conscious beings without [present] effort; that too must be produced by the determination of another quality of the conscious being—such is the inference.

This [inference] is contradicted if the connection with pleasure and pain is not caused by karma. And that other quality is ‘unseen’ because it is not directly felt, and it is indeterminate because the time of its maturation is not fixed. Cognition and the rest, by contrast, are directly felt and transient.
Now, the contradiction with testimony: Plentiful indeed is this collection of teachings of the ṛṣis stemming from Vedic revelation, which rests upon performance and avoidance; and the fruit of this teaching for embodied beings according to the division of class and stage of life is activity characterized by performance and cessation characterized by avoidance. And both of these are contradicted on this view that ‘there is no karma, whether well done or ill done; how could the connection of persons with pleasure and pain be caused by karma?’ This is the false view of the most wicked: that the creation of the body is not caused by karma, and the connection with pleasure and pain is not caused by karma. ||72