Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Nyāya Sūtras 376

Nyāyabhāṣya 376

Language
Sanskrit

376.2

avasthitasyopādānasya dharmamātraṃ nivartate dharmamātram upajāyate sa khalūtpattivināśayor viṣayaḥ/

A mere property of an enduring material cause ceases, a mere property arises; that indeed is the object of origination and destruction.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

376.3

yac copajāyate tat prāg apy upajananād asti, yac ca nivartate tan nivṛttam apy astīti, evaṃ ca sarvasya nityatvam iti?

And that which arises exists even prior to arising, and that which ceases exists even after having ceased; and thus all is permanent?

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

376.4

na vyavasthānupapatteḥ ||

[It is] not [so], because a definite distinction is untenable.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

376.5

ayam upajanaḥ iyaṃ nivṛttir iti vyavasthā nopapadyate, upajātanivṛttayor vidyamānatvāt/ ayaṃ dharma upajāto 'yaṃ nivṛtta iti sadbhāvāviśeṣād avyavasthā, idānīm upajananivṛttī nedānīm iti kālavyavasthā nopapadyate sarvadā vidyamānatvāt asya dharmasyopajananivṛttī nāsyeti vyavasthānupapattiḥ,

The definite distinction that 'this is an arising, this is a cessation' is untenable, because both the arisen and the ceased would [always] be existent. The lack of a definite distinction follows from there being no difference in their existence, [namely that] 'this property has arisen, this has ceased.' The temporal distinction that 'arising and cessation occur now, not now' is untenable because they would exist at all times. The definite distinction that 'arising and cessation belong to this property, not to that' is untenable,

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

376.6

ubhyor aviśeṣāt/ anāgato 'tīta iti ca kālavyavasthānupapattiḥ, vartamānasya sadbhāvalakṣaṇatvāt/ avidyamānasyātmalābha upajano vidyamānasyātmahānaṃ nivṛttir ity etasmin sati naite doṣāḥ/ tasmād yad uktaṃ prāg apy upajanād asti nivṛttaṃ cāsti tad ayuktam iti//33//

because there is no difference between the two. And the temporal distinction of 'future' and 'past' is untenable, because the present is characterized by existence. When it is maintained that arising is the acquisition of its own nature by what was non-existent, and cessation is the loss of its own nature by what was existent, these faults do not occur. Therefore, what was said—that it exists even prior to arising and exists after having ceased—is incorrect.

English (machine translation) (machine translation)

Translations (1)

Commentaries (2)

Linked texts (1)