Nyayasutra 402

To this, it is replied: As for what was said, "because of the continuity of debts", [it means] "as if by debts"—

Nyāyasūtra 4.1.59: Because the primary sense of the word is impossible, there is a reiteration by means of a secondary sense, since censure and praise are appropriate.

[The word] "by debts" is not used here in its primary sense. For the word "debt" is used in its primary sense where one person gives what is to be returned and a second takes what is to be returned, because it is observed there. And that is not applicable here; because the primary sense of the word is impossible, this is a reiteration by means of a secondary sense, meaning "as if by debts."

And this is a figurative expression, just like "the boy is fire"; for this word "debt", which is observed elsewhere, is used here, just as the word "fire" is used of a boy. How is it a reiteration by means of a secondary sense? Because censure and praise are appropriate: upon the omission of rites, one is censured as if a debtor for receiving a debt; and upon the performance of rites, one is praised as if a debtor for repaying a debt. That indeed is the purpose of the comparison.

[The word] "being born" is a secondary word, because otherwise there is an absence of eligibility. And the statement "a brāhmaṇa, indeed, being born" is a secondary word [meaning] "becoming a householder, he is being born." When he becomes a householder, then he is qualified for the rites, because one being born from a mother has no eligibility. But when a boy is born from a mother, he is not then qualified for rites, because eligibility belongs to one who desires [the result] and is capable. Eligibility for rites belongs to one who desires [the result], because the desire is enjoined in the injunction of the rite, such as: "One who desires heaven should perform the agnihotra." And [it belongs] to one who is capable, because activity is possible [only] for one who is capable; for a capable person engages in an enjoined rite, not anyone else. But both are absent in the primary sense of the word: in a boy being born from a mother, both desire and capability do not exist.

And Vedic statement does not differ from ordinary worldly statement, in that it is composed by a person acting with deliberation. In that regard, even an ordinary, uncritical person would not say to a newly born child: "Study, sacrifice, observe celibacy!" How, then, could a seer, who speaks reasonably and faultlessly, engaged for the purpose of instruction, give such instruction? Indeed, a dancer does not perform before the blind, nor a singer before the deaf.
And the object of instruction is the comprehension of the instructed matter. Instruction is directed toward one who understands the matter instructed, and this is not the case with a newly born child. Moreover, the mantra and brāhmaṇa describe rites having the marks of the householder stage. And the rite that the mantra and brāhmaṇa describe is accompanied by marks of the householder stage, such as association with a wife; therefore, it is the householder who is referred to as "being born."
And when desire does not alter, the statement "lasting until old age or death" is appropriate.

As long as one's desire for the fruit does not alter, does not turn back, so long is the rite to be performed by him; thus the statement "lasting until old age or death" is appropriate with respect to him. And "by old age" refers to the fourth stage of life, which is associated with renunciation, in the statement: "Indeed, he is freed from this [sacrifice] by old age." The fourth stage of life, associated with renunciation, is called "old age", for renunciation is enjoined there; in the case of extreme old age, the statement "indeed by old age" would be meaningless. Nor is this reasonable: "The incapable person is released"; for [the Veda] states external capability for one who is personally incapable: "Or a pupil may sacrifice, purchased through sacred knowledge; or a milk-priest may sacrifice, purchased through wealth."

Moreover, should what is already enjoined be reiterated, or should a meaning be imagined out of arbitrary desire? A restatement of what is enjoined is logical. The householder engages in rites not being his own master, as if he were in debt; thus the efficacy of the statement is reasonable,

for the means to the fruit are the object of effort, not the fruit itself; when they are accomplished, they serve for the fruit. And what is enjoined is "being born", and "being born" is enjoined; he who is connected with that is this "one being born."
If it is argued that there is no other stage of life because there is no direct injunction [of it], no, because there is also no direct injunction of its prohibition. The householder stage is directly enjoined by the brāhmaṇa; if there had been another stage of life, that too would have been directly

enjoined; because of the absence of a direct injunction, there is no other stage of life. [We reply:] No, because there is also no direct injunction of a prohibition; for a prohibition is not directly enjoined by the brāhmaṇa either—such as, "There are no other stages of life, there is only the householder stage"; because no prohibition is directly heard, this is untenable.
And injunction is according to domain, as in the case of other sciences. Just as other treatises are direct enjoiners within their own respective domains, and not because of the non-existence of other matters, so this brāhmaṇa, being a treatise for householders, is a direct enjoiner within its own domain, not because of the non-existence of other stages of life.

Moreover, verses (ṛc) and Brāhmaṇa passages expressing final release are stated. Both verses and Brāhmaṇa passages speak of final release. Verses first: / 'By rituals the seers, possessing offspring and desiring wealth, encountered death; then other seers, who were wise, attained immortality beyond rituals.' / 'Not by ritual, not by offspring, nor by wealth, but by renunciation did some attain immortality; that which shines beyond heaven, set in the secret cave, into which the ascetics enter.' / 'I know this great Person, sun-colored, beyond darkness; knowing him alone does one cross over death; there is no other path for going.' / Now Brāhmaṇa passages: / 'Three are the branches of duty: sacrifice, study, and charity constitute the first; asceticism itself is the second; a student of the Veda residing in the household of a teacher, totally wearing down himself in the household of the teacher, is the third; all these become possessors of meritorious worlds; one established in Brahman attains immortality.' / 'Desiring this very world, renunciants renounce.'

'Now indeed they say: this person consists purely of desire; as his desire is, so is his resolve; as his resolve is, such ritual action does he do; whatever ritual action he does, that he attains.' / Having thus stated transmigration through ritual actions, they teach something different that is under discussion: 'So much for the desiring one. Now the one who does not desire: he who is free of desire, devoid of desire, whose desire is the Self, whose desires are attained—his vital breaths do not depart; right here they dissolve; being Brahman indeed, he goes to Brahman.' / In this regard, that which was said—namely, that there is no final release because of connection with debts—that is incorrect. And because of the Vedic passage 'These four paths are the ways of the gods,' which refers to the four stages of life, the doctrine of a single stage of life is untenable. (59)