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Nyāya Sūtras 42

Nyāyabhāṣya 42

Language
Sanskrit

42.2

etasmiṃś ca tarkaviṣaye ---

And regarding this object of hypothetical reasoning—

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42.3

vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ ||

Ascertainment is the determination of an object by means of thesis and counter-thesis after having considered [it].

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42.4

sthāpanā sādhanam, pratiṣedha upālambhaḥ/ tau sādhanopālambhau pakṣapratipakṣāśrayau vyatiṣaktāv anubandhena pravartamānau pakṣapratipakṣāv ity ucyete/ tayor anyatarasya nivṛttir ekatarasyāvasthānam avaśyambhāvi, yasyāvasthānaṃ tasyārthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ/
nedaṃ pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ sambhavatīti --- eko hi pratijñātam arthaṃ hetutaḥ sthāpayati pratiṣiddhaṃ coddharati dvitīyasya/ dvitīyena sthāpanāhetuḥ pratiṣidhyate tasyaiva pratiṣedhahetuś coddhriyate sa nivartate/

Proof is establishment; refutation is objection. Those two, establishment and objection, resting upon thesis and counter-thesis, intertwined and proceeding continuously, are called 'thesis and counter-thesis'. Of the two, the cessation of one and the remaining of the other is inevitable; of that which remains, the determination of the object is ascertainment. [Objection:] 'This determination of an object by both thesis and counter-thesis is impossible.' For one person establishes by a logical reason an asserted object and removes [the objection] refuted by the second person; by the second, the logical reason for the establishment is refuted and the logical reason for his own refutation is raised, and that [first one] ceases.

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42.5

tasya nivṛttau yo 'vatiṣṭhate tenārthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ/
ubhābhyām evārthāvadhāraṇam ity āha/ kayā yuktyā? ekasya sambhavo dvitīyasyāsambhavaḥ/ tāv etau sambhavāsambhavau vimarśaṃ saha nivarttayataḥ --- ubhayasambhave ubhayāsambhave vānivṛtto vimarśa iti/ vimṛśyeti vimarśaṃ kṛtvā/ so 'yaṃ vimarśaḥ pakṣapratipakṣāv avadyotya nyāyaṃ pravartayatīty upādīyata iti/ etac ca viruddhayor ekadharmisthayor boddhavyam/ yatra tu dharmisāmānyagatau viruddhau dharmau hetutaḥ sambhavataḥ tatra samuccayaḥ, hetuto 'rthasya tathābhāvopapatteḥ/ yathā --- kriyāvad dravyam iti lakṣaṇavacane yasya dravyasya kriyāyogo hetutaḥ sambhavati tat kriyāvat, yasya na sambhavati tad akriyam iti/ ekadharmisthayoś ca viruddhayor dharmayor ayugapadbhāvinoḥ kālavikalpaḥ/ yathā --- tad eva dravyaṃ kriyāyuktaṃ kriyāvat, anutpannoparatakriyaṃ punar akriyam iti/
na cāyaṃ nirṇaye niyamo vimṛśyaiva pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇaya iti, kiṃ tv indriyārthasannikarṣotpannapratyakṣe 'rthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇaya iti, parīkṣāviṣaye tu vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ/ vāde śāstre ca vimarśavarjam// 41 //

Upon its cessation, that which remains—by that the determination of the object is ascertainment. [Response:] He says that the determination of the object is by both. By what reasoning? The possibility of the one and the impossibility of the second: these two, possibility and impossibility, together eliminate the consideration. If both were possible or both were impossible, the consideration would not cease. 'Having considered' means having made a consideration. This consideration, illuminating thesis and counter-thesis, sets reasoning in motion; therefore it is included. And this should be understood [only] in the case of two contradictory [properties] residing in a single locus. But where contradictory properties relating to a common class of loci are possible through logical reasons, there is combination, because through logical reasons the object is proved to be so. For example, in the definitional statement 'a substance is that which possesses action', that substance for which connection with action is possible through a logical reason is possessing action, and that for which it is not possible is actionless. And in the case of two contradictory properties residing in a single locus that do not exist simultaneously, there is temporal differentiation. For example, that very substance, when joined with action, possesses action, but when its action has not arisen or has ceased, it is actionless. And this is not a restrictive rule for ascertainment—that ascertainment is the determination of an object only after having considered through thesis and counter-thesis; rather, in perception arisen from the contact of sense organ and object, the determination of an object is ascertainment, but in the realm of critical investigation, ascertainment is the determination of an object by thesis and counter-thesis after having considered; and in philosophical debate and treatise, it is devoid of consideration. ||41

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