Nyāya Sūtras 43

43.2

iti vātsyāyanīye nyāyabhāṣye prathamādhyāyasya prathamāhnikam/

Thus ends the first daily lesson of the first chapter in the Commentary on the Nyāyasūtra by Vātsyāyana.

43.3

dvitīyāhnikam

43.4

tisraḥ kathā bhavanti --- vādo jalpo vitaṇḍā ceti/ tāsām ---

There are three kinds of philosophical discussion: philosophical debate, disputation, and cavil. Of these—

43.5

pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ ||

Philosophical debate is the adoption of thesis and counter-thesis, which consists in establishment and refutation by means of valid cognition and hypothetical reasoning, is not contrary to established tenets, and is endowed with the five components of an inference.

43.6

ekādhikaraṇasthau viruddhau dharmau pakṣapratipakṣau pratyanīkabhāvāt, asty ātmā nāsty ātmeti/

Two contradictory properties residing in a single substratum are thesis and counter-thesis because of their mutual opposition, as in: 'the self exists', 'the self does not exist'.

43.7

nānādhikaraṇasthau viruddhau na pakṣapratipakṣau, yathā --- nitya ātmā anityā buddhir iti/ parigraho 'bhyupagamavyavasthā/ so 'yam pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ/ tasya viśeṣanaṃ pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ, pramāṇais tarkeṇa ca sādhanam upālambhaś cāsmin kriyata iti/ sādhanaṃ sthāpanā/ upālambhaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ/ tau sādhanopālambhāv ubhayor api pakṣayor vyatiṣaktāv anubaddhau ca yāvad eko nivṛtta ekataro vyavasthita iti nivṛttasyopālambho vyavasthitasya sādhanam iti/

Contradictory [properties] residing in different substrata are not thesis and counter-thesis, as in: 'the self is eternal', 'intellect is non-eternal'. 'Adoption' is the settlement of an acceptance. This adoption of thesis and counter-thesis is philosophical debate. Its qualification is 'which consists in establishment and refutation by means of valid cognition and hypothetical reasoning', meaning: in this [debate], establishment and refutation are carried out by means of valid cognition and by hypothetical reasoning. Establishment is proof; refutation is objection. Those two, establishment and refutation, are intertwined and connected in both theses as well, until one has ceased and the other is established; thus the refutation belongs to that which has ceased, and the establishment belongs to that which is established.

43.8

jalpe nigrahasthānaviniyogād vāde tatpratiṣedhaḥ/ pratiṣedhe kasyacid abhyanujñānārthaṃ siddhāntāviruddha iti vacanam/

Because points of defeat are employed in disputation, they are prohibited in philosophical debate. In that prohibition, the phrase 'not contrary to established tenets' is stated for the purpose of admitting a certain [point of defeat].

43.9

``siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddha'' iti hetvābhāsasya nigrahasthānasyābhyanujñā vāde/ pañcāvayavopapanna iti

By the rule, 'Having accepted an established tenet, that which contradicts it is contradictory,' this pseudo-reason is admitted as a point of defeat in philosophical debate. By the phrase 'endowed with the five components of an inference,'

43.10

``hīnam anyatamenāpy avayavena nyūnam'' ``hetūdāharaṇādhikam adhikam'' iti caitayor abhyanujñānārtham iti/ avayaveṣu pramānatarkāntarbhāve pṛthak pramāṇatarkagrahaṇaṃ sādhanopālambhavyatiṣaṅgajñāpanārtham/ anyathobhāv api pakṣau sthāpanāpravṛttau vāda iti syāt/

the admission of these two [points of defeat] is intended: 'Deficient in any one component is deficient' and 'Surplus in logical reason or example is surplus.' The separate mention of means of valid cognition and hypothetical reasoning, even though they are subsumed under the components of an inference, is for the purpose of indicating the interweaving of proof and refutation. Otherwise, philosophical debate would consist merely in both theses being engaged in proof.

43.11

antareṇāpi cāvayavasambandhaṃ pramāṇāny arthaṃ sādhayantīti dṛṣṭam, tenāpi kalpena sādhanopālambhau vāde bhavata iti jñāpayati/ ``chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpa'' iti vacanād vinigraho jalpa iti mā vijñāyi, chalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambha eva jalpaḥ pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambho vād eveti mā vijñāyīty evamarthaṃ pṛthak pramānatarkagrahaṇam iti// 1 //

And it is observed that means of valid cognition establish an object even without connection to the components [of an inference]; it indicates that proof and refutation in philosophical debate take place in that manner as well. Lest disputation be understood as defeated [by mere trickery], from the statement, 'Disputation is that in which proof and refutation are carried out by means of quibbles, futile rejoinders, and points of defeat'—and lest it be understood that disputation is exclusively proof and refutation by quibble, futile rejoinder, and point of defeat, while philosophical debate is exclusively proof and refutation by means of valid cognition and hypothetical reasoning—for this reason there is a separate mention of means of valid cognition and hypothetical reasoning. || 1