Nyāya Sūtras 5

Now comes the statement of the definitions of those that have been classified.

Perception is cognition that arises from contact between a sense organ and an object, is non-verbal, non-deviating, and determinate.

That cognition which arises from the contact of a sense organ with an object is perception.

[Objection:] Does it not then follow that this does not occur now: 'The self comes into contact with the internal organ, the internal organ with the sense organ, the sense organ with the object'?

[Reply:] This is not an exhaustive determination of causes—[saying] that only this much is the cause in perception—but rather the statement of the specific cause. That which is the specific cause of perceptual cognition is stated; that, however, which is common to inferential cognition and so forth is not excluded.
[Objection:] Then the contact of the internal organ with the sense organ ought to be stated?

[Reply:] Even as perceptual cognition varies, this [contact] does not vary; hence it is not stated, because of its commonality.

As many objects as there are, so many indeed are the name-words; through them arises the comprehension of an object, and from the comprehension of an object arises practical behavior. In that regard, this cognition of an object produced from the contact of sense organ and object takes the form 'color' or 'taste'; and the words 'color' and 'taste' are names of the object. Cognition is designated by that: one cognizes [it] as 'color', one cognizes [it] as 'taste'. Being designated by a name-word, there would be the contingency of its being verbal; therefore he says: 'non-verbal'.

That cognition of an object which occurs when the relation between word and object is not applied is not designated by a name-word; even when the relation between word and object is grasped, [in the form] 'this word is the name of this object,' yet when that object is grasped,

it is not distinct from the previous cognition of the object; that cognition of the object is of just that kind. But for that cognition of the object there is no other designation-word by which it, being understood, could serve for practical communication. And without being understood there is no practical communication. Therefore it is indicated by the name-word of the object to be known accompanied by the marker 'iti'—[such as] the cognition 'color', the cognition 'taste'. Thus, at the time of the cognition of an object, that designation-word does not operate, but it operates at the time of practical communication. Therefore, the cognition of an object arising from contact of sense organ and object is not verbal.

In summer, shimmering rays mingled with heat from the earth come into contact with the eye of someone standing at a distance;

there, from the contact of the sense organ with the object, the cognition 'water' arises, and that would contingently be perception; therefore he says: 'non-deviating'. That which is [a cognition of] that in what is not that is deviating [cognition], [not valid] perception.

Seeing an object with the eye from a distance, a person does not determine whether it is smoke or dust. That non-determining cognition, arising from the contact of sense organ and object, would contingently be perception; therefore he says: 'determinate'. And it should not be thought that non-determining cognition is born solely of the contact of the self and the internal organ. For, seeing an object with the eye, he does not determine [it];

and just as he apprehends with the internal organ an object apprehended with a sense organ, so too, not determining [it] with the sense organ, he does not determine [it] with the internal organ. And that non-determination by the internal organ, which is preceded by non-determination by the sense organ—being a mere consideration seeking specific features—is doubt, not the former. Everywhere in the realm of perception, the cognizer's determinate cognition occurs through the sense organ,

and subsequently there is apperception through the internal organ, because there is an absence of apperception in those whose sense organs are damaged.
[Objection:] A definition of perception must be stated with respect to the self and so forth and pleasure and so forth, for that [cognition] is not produced from contact between an [external] sense organ and an object.
[Reply:] The internal organ, while indeed being a sense organ, is taught separately from the sense organs because of a difference in properties: the [external] sense organs are elemental and have restricted objects,

and their status as sense organs exists insofar as they possess [those] qualities; the internal organ, however, is non-elemental and has all things as its object, and its status as a sense organ does not depend on its possessing [those] qualities. Moreover, given the contact between sense organ and object, we shall explain its presence and absence as the cause of the non-arising of simultaneous cognitions.

And because the internal organ is a sense organ, another definition need not be stated. And this should be accepted from the usage of another treatise, for a methodological rule of treatises states: 'An opinion of another which is not opposed is accepted.' Perception has been explained. || 4