Nyāya Sūtras 54

Verbal quibble is the imagining of a different meaning from the speaker's intention when a word is uttered without specification.

The usage is: "This boy has a new blanket (navakambalaḥ)." Here, the speaker's intention is: "His blanket is new (navaḥ kambalaḥ)." Distinction [exists] in the analytical paraphrase (vigraha), but not in the compound (samāsa). In that case, this quibbler presumes another meaning, not intended by the speaker, assuming: "First of all, you have said: 'He has nine blankets (nava kambalāḥ)'."

And having so presumed, he denies it on the grounds of impossibility: "He has one blanket; how could there be nine blankets?" That is quibble with regard to an ambiguous speech, [hence called] verbal quibble. The counter-argument against this [is as follows]: When a general word has multiple meanings, a specific reason must be stated for presuming the designation of one or the other. "Navakambala" designates multiple meanings: "he has a new blanket" or "he has nine blankets". When this is used, regarding the presumption: "You have said 'he has nine blankets,' and that is not possible"—in this presumption of one designation rather than the other, a specific reason must be stated. For, through a specific reason it is discerned among particular meanings that "this meaning was stated by this [speaker]". And that specific reason does not exist. Therefore, this is merely a false accusation. Moreover, the relation between word and meaning is well known in the world as the fixed assignment of designator and designated. "This meaning is designated by this designator" applies equally to a general word, and a specific [meaning] belongs to a qualified word. And these words are used with reference to an object having been previously used, not without having been previously used. And usage has the purpose of causing understanding of the meaning. And ordinary communication proceeds from the understanding of the meaning.

In that case, when words are thus used for the purpose of conveying meaning, the restriction of the usage of a general word is determined by capacity. General words, being such, as in "Lead the goat to the village," "Bring the ghee," "Feed the Brahmin," are used with reference to parts of the object through capacity; they apply where an injunction for practical action is possible, not to the generic object, because an injunction of action is impossible [with regard to the genus]. In the same way, this general word "navakambala" applies where the meaning is possible, namely, "his blanket is new"; but it does not apply where it is impossible, namely, "he has nine blankets." Thus, this censure of another's statement through the presumption of an impossible meaning does not hold. //12