Nyāya Sūtras 73

Nyāyasūtra 2.1.11: If they are established simultaneously, there would be an absence of sequential occurrence of cognitions, because [cognitions] are restricted to each particular object.

If the means of valid cognition and the object of valid cognition exist simultaneously, even then, cognitions regarding sensory objects such as odor, being restricted to each particular object, would occur simultaneously; and because cognitions would be restricted to [their respective] percepts, there would be an absence of sequential occurrence. These cognitions that occur sequentially regarding objects could not have sequential occurrence. And there would be a contradiction with [the sūtra]: "The non-arising of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of the mind." And this is the full extent of the domain regarding the existence of the means of valid cognition and the object of valid cognition, and that is untenable. Therefore, the status of perception and the others as means of valid cognition cannot be maintained.
The resolution to this [is as follows]: Because there is no fixed rule regarding the prior, posterior, or simultaneous occurrence of the cause of apprehension and the object that is the domain of apprehension, the statement is to be differentiated according to observation.

In some cases the cause of apprehension [is first], and the domain of apprehension is later, as in the case of the light of the sun for things that are being brought into being. In some cases the domain of apprehension is first and the cause of apprehension is later, as in the case of a lamp for existing things. In some cases the cause of apprehension and the domain of apprehension occur together, as in the cognition of fire by means of smoke. And the cause of apprehension is the means of valid cognition, while the domain of apprehension is the object of valid cognition. Thus, since the prior, posterior, or simultaneous occurrence of the means of valid cognition and the object of valid cognition is not fixed, the statement must be made by making distinctions in accordance with how the object is observed. Therefore, the absolute denial is untenable, for the denial was asserted by merely making a general division.
Because the basis for designation is connected to the three times, the designation is of that nature. As for the claim that if it is established afterward, the object of valid cognition cannot be established in the absence of the means of valid cognition, since an object is understood to be an object of valid cognition when it is being cognized by a means of valid cognition: The basis for this designation, "means of valid cognition," is being the cause of apprehension,

and that has a connection to the three times. "It produced apprehension," "it produces apprehension," "it will produce apprehension"—because the basis for designation is connected to the three times, the designation is of that nature: "The object was cognized by this, is cognized, will be cognized," hence it is a means of valid cognition; and "it was cognized, is cognized, will be cognized," hence it is an object of valid cognition. Such being the case, "apprehension will arise in this [object] from the cause," "this object will be cognized," "this is an object of valid cognition"—all this holds true. And if the three times were not admitted, worldly transaction would be untenable. For one who does not admit this, the ordinary usage, "Bring the cook, he will cook; bring the reaper, he will reap," would not be tenable.
The statement, "Perception and the others lack the status of means of valid cognition because their establishment across the three times is impossible," and so forth, is a denial of means of valid cognition. There, he should be asked: "Now, by this denial, what is being done by you? Is an actual possibility being refuted, or is an impossibility being made known?"

If a possibility is being refuted, then while possibility exists, the denial of perception and the others is untenable. If an impossibility is being made known, then the denial has acquired the character of a means of valid cognition, because it is the cause of apprehension of the impossibility of the means of valid cognition.