Nyāya Sūtras 91
Nyāyabhāṣya 91
- Language
- Sanskrit
91.2
yad uktam indriyārthasannikarṣagrahaṇaṃ kāryam, nātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣasyeti, kasmāt? suptavyāsaktamanasām indriyārthayoḥ sannikarṣasya jñānanimittatvād iti/ so 'yam ---
As for what was said—that contact between the sense organ and the object must be mentioned, but not contact between the self and the mind; why? because contact between the sense organ and the object is the cause of cognition for those who are asleep or whose minds are elsewhere engaged—this [assertion]:
91.3
vyāhatatvād ahetuḥ ||
Is not a valid reason, because it is self-contradictory.
91.4
yadi tāvat kvacid ātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣasya jñānakāraṇatvaṃ neṣyate, tadā ``yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam'' iti vyāhanyeta/ nedānīṃ manasaḥ sannikarṣam indriyārthasannikarṣo 'pekṣate/
If it is maintained that contact between the self and the mind is not the cause of cognition in some cases, then [the tenet that] “the non-arising of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the mind” would be contradicted. Now contact between the sense organ and the object would not depend upon contact with the mind.
91.5
manaḥsaṃyogānapekṣāyāṃ ca yugapajjñānotpattiprasaṅgaḥ/ atha mā bhūd vyāghāta iti sarvavijñānānām ātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣaḥ kāraṇam iṣyate, tadavastham evedaṃ bhavati; jñānakāraṇatvād ātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣasya grahaṇaṃ kāryam iti//29//
And if it does not depend on conjunction with the mind, there would be the undesirable consequence that cognitions arise simultaneously. On the other hand, lest there be a contradiction, if contact between the self and the mind is accepted as the cause of all cognitions, the situation remains just as it was: because it is the cause of cognition, contact between the self and the mind must be mentioned. //29
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
- Nyāyavārttika — Uddyotakara, Sanskrit
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit